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Abstract
As experienced fighter pilots leave the United States Air Force (USAF) and Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF), there is a need to develop new competent pilots to meet
national defense requirements. Fighter training programs are expensive for taxpayers, and
the USAF and RAAF face significant resource problems developing and implementing
these programs. Using policy feedback theory and punctuated equilibrium theory as the
theoretical foundation, the purpose of this comparative, multi-case study of current USAF
F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter pilot training policies was to inform training policy
development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training programs.
Data were gathered from training policy documents and 12 interviews with F-16 and F18 pilots. Data were deductively coded and analyzed using policy feedback and
punctuated event themes. Findings indicate that policy feedbacks and punctuated events
influence fighter pilot training policy. Best practices for training include optimum stress
management, appropriate academic course timing, and phase-based training techniques.
Optimal instructional approaches included a servant leadership philosophy and a need for
improved kinesthetic flight preparation tools and procedures. The USAF and RAAF
approach fighter pilot training differently. The positive social change implications
stemming from this study include recommendations to the USAF and RAAF that may
improve fighter pilot training policy at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayers.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Fighter pilot training is an expensive frontline national defense program for the
United States and the Australian governments. Each nation relies heavily on airpower for
its national defense (Hampton, 2014; Maldonado, 2015; Williams, 2001). Therefore, each
military has an interest in ensuring that introductory fighter training produces the most
proficient pilots possible. Additionally, the use of airpower often has life and death
consequences. There is a tangible value in developing pilots who have the skills to
accomplish tactical objectives with as little loss of life and damage to property as possible
(Olds, Rasimus, & Olds, 2010). A key component of the effective application of
airpower, while limiting collateral damage, is ensuring that pilots are trained to meet the
demands of each mission. In this qualitative study, I compared United States Air Force
(USAF) F-16 and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) F-18 training programs in order to
provide U.S. and Australian policy makers new insights to develop future training
policies that facilitate better use of resources to train fighter pilots.
Additionally, the USAF and RAAF are currently involved in the transition from
fourth generation fighters such as the F-16 and F-18 to the fifth generation F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF). The U.S. partnership with Australia will grow more interconnected
and training opportunities will increase in the future as the United States and many of its
allies transition to the JSF (USAF, 2015). This study serves as a baseline for policy
makers to compare and contrast USAF and RAAF training. In this dissertation, I have
provided information fighter training policy makers can use to improve developing JSF
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training programs or that at least may improve understanding between the USAF and
RAAF as they work together in the future. Finally, there is a collective American social
value in preserving lives and minimizing the impact of armed conflict whenever possible
(Hampton, 2013). Striving to improve training techniques through careful analysis is an
important step in meeting those objectives in the unforgiving world of tactical aviation.
In this chapter, I provide a broad background in order to justify the utility of the
study by offering the problem statement and introducing the research question. Further, I
explain how I used policy feedback, punctuated equilibrium, learning theory, and an
examination of fighter pilot cultures in the qualitative analysis to serve as frameworks for
comparing USAF and RAAF training policy. My goal in conducting the comparison was
to gain a better understanding of (a) the factors that influence stakeholders to resist,
accept, and instigate changes to policy, and (b) how the current policy process influences
future training policy. It is important to note that the USAF, RAAF, and the Walden
academic community communicate in English; however, each organization has its own
language and culture. This study was written in plain English whenever possible and the
use of jargon and acronyms are explained. Finally, the study is unclassified.
Background
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces a significant challenge in
developing effective fighter pilot training policy. This is because there is a need to meet
mandated fighter pilot manning levels during a period of diminishing budgets and fiscal
uncertainty (Chapman & Colegrove, 2013; Maldonado, 2015). As seasoned aviators
depart the USAF, policy makers desire to prevent previous mistakes from past force
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reductions (Coe & Schmitt, 1997; Taylor, Moore, & Roll, 2000). The DoD's goal is to
balance the remaining resources to develop confident, safe, and competent new fighter
pilots (Croft, 2012; Ennels, 2002). For example, there is a growing concern that
introducing larger F-16 class sizes to meet the increase in fighter pilot demand to solve a
current USAF fighter pilot manning crisis (Pawlyk, 2017) could reduce the quality of
pilots graduating from introductory F-16 training.
The USAF F-16 course-training managers consistently seek new ways to improve
F-16 training. However, there has not been a comparative analysis exploring how the
RAAF conducts its F-18 training compared to the USAF F-16 program. The USAF and
RAAF conduct a typical western fighter-training program (Hampton, 2014). It is
important to note that the USAF and RAAF model is not the only model for fighter pilot
training. For example, the United States Marines conduct air to surface prior to air to air
training, and the Dutch are experimenting with introducing missionized training scenarios
earlier in the training pipeline rather than following the ridged building block approach
used in the USAF and RAAF programs (Van der Pal, Boland, & de Rivecourt, 2009).
The fact that the USAF and RAAF training programs were designed similarly was
helpful during the study because each course provided an easy to identify training
standard or common language that I used to more fully explore the idiosyncrasies of each
program.
The RAAF is a small air force and its F-18 training program is constrained by
significant resource limitations (Australian Government, 2015; William, 2001). This case
study comparing the RAAF F-18 training policy with the USAF F-16 training policy can
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give course designers insights and new ideas to improve course structure. As a means of
comparison, I used policy feedback and punctuated equilibrium to explore how each
community develops its policies. Learning style theory was used as a comparative tool to
explore how fighter-training programs are constructed and to focus on the actual content
and instructional techniques of the courses rather than the overarching training policy.
The reason for this delineation is that learning style theory helped me compare and
understand the components of the course so that I could more easily understand the
resulting overarching training policy. Finally, I included an examination of the fighter
pilot cultures to provide a comprehensive understanding of how fighter training programs
and policy are developed. The resulting information can aid policy makers in deciding
how best to allocate resources during future USAF fighter pilot training programs.
Although the study explores specific USAF and RAAF training programs, the
information can also prove valuable to policy makers administering other DoD and allied
nation training programs.
Although the USAF has conducted studies to improve fighter pilot training, there
has not been a direct comparison between the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 training
programs. I am an USAF F-16 instructor pilot who recently served as an exchange officer
with the RAAF. Drawing on this unique experience, I sought to provide policy makers
new information to help improve future fighter training programs.
Problem Statement
The USAF is required to develop enough fighter pilots with the correct skills to
meet the needs mandated by the DoD. The DoD has attempted to balance the amount of
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resources, manpower, and finances used to train U.S. fighter pilots. During the Vietnam
War, fighter pilot training was abbreviated to replace downed fighter pilots (Chapman &
Colegrove, 2013; Hampton, 2014; Olds et al., 2010). As a result, many new pilots were
inexperienced and faced a dangerously steep learning curve to survive in combat. In
contrast, during the robust military buildup of the 1980s and leading into the Gulf War,
many pilots had thousands of training hours before their first combat experience (Coe &
Schmitt, 1997). The DoD faces a problem as experienced fighter pilots leave the USAF
over the next decade. There is a need to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam by developing
new pilots and weapons systems that are capable of meeting DoD defense requirements
within current national budget constraints. The goal is to improve future policy to
efficiently balance resources to provide safe, competent, and confident new fighter pilots.
The RAAF also faces resource constraints for its fighter pilot training programs (Auditor
General, 2004; Australian Government, 2015). Both the USAF and RAAF are
cooperating in the development of the new F-35 program and the resulting training policy
(USAF, 2015). In this case study, I investigated RAAF F-18 training policy compared
with F-16 training policy. The results may provide the USAF and RAAF with new
insights into alternative options to improve training policy.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to compare and understand the
differences between USAF F-16 training and RAAF F-18 training in order to provide
policy makers new knowledge to improve future fighter training programs. The 2015
USAF active duty F-16 training program budget was $144 million with 10,800 sorties
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and 14,600 flying hours (USAF, 2015). In 2004, the RAAF spent an estimated $15.2
million to train each new F-18 pilot (Auditor General, 2004). The 2015 USAF F-35
training program is currently budgeted at $7.8 billon (Gertler, 2014) and the RAAF plans
to spend $17 billion in the next 5 years to acquire the JSF (Australian Government,
2015). Additionally, Maldonado (2015) found the F-35 program to play a significant role
in the future national security of the United States, and the USAF announced it plans to
continue flying the F-16 until 2048 (Clashman, 2017). Considering the cost and
importance of these programs to national defense, in this study I sought to better
understand current fighter pilot training programs to help future policy makers develop
new policies that minimize costs and maximize combat capability.
Research Questions
The following central research question guided this study:
What can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter pilot training policies reveal about
the best practices and optimal instructional approaches to improve policy development
and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training programs?
Sub-questions:
1. How influential are current RAAF and USAF policy practices in shaping the
development of future policy?
2. What training techniques are perceived to be most effective and efficient to
train new fighter pilots as fighter aircraft technology and training systems
advance?
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3. What impact will new technologies such as aircraft upgrades, simulator
capability, and new aircraft have in shaping future policy?
Theoretical Guidance
The framework for the study was based on a direct comparison of the USAF and
RAAF policy documents and cultures that define the current policy. USAF and RAAF
policies continue to evolve, and policy feedback theory (PFT) as well as punctuated
equilibrium theory (PET) may complement each other to help explain how current policy
will influence future policy and help determine what factors will force a shift in policy.
The pilot training process began before the Wright brothers’ first flight and the
evolution of flight training policy continues today (Ennels, 2002). There is conflicting
information concerning how best to structure pilot training courses and what are the most
effective ways to bring pilots to the required standard in the shortest amount of time. In
the literature review, I focused on PFT and PET to explain how stakeholders receive and
process inputs that lead to future policy outputs. For example, I sought to understand
what sorts of cultural, technological, and political factors most influence fighter pilot
training policy development and implementation. Learning style theory is also introduced
in the literature review because I used it as a comparative tool to aid data collection.
Adding to the complexity of this issue is the fact that different air forces develop their
own organizational cultures, which influence how pilot training courses are designed and
implemented (Hampton, 2014). The USAF and RAAF cultures will likely become more
intertwined during the transition to the JSF, and understanding each culture is important
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to understanding the current policy and how to improve future policy within each
organization.
Nature of the Study
Theory
PFT and PET have become important components in policy scholars’
understanding of public policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The phenomenon I
investigated is that the USAF and RAAF conduct very different fighter training programs
and policies, but both produce highly proficient, multirole, single seat, fighter pilots. For
example, in the current fight against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, USAF F-16s and RAAF F18s are used interchangeably to accomplish Combined Forces Air Component
Commander (CFACC) objectives (Laird, 2015; Pawlyk, 2016). Given these different
training policies, I sought to understand how each nation develops fighter-training
programs that ultimately facilitate the production of fighter pilots with similar
competency levels through very different means. PFT predicts that current policy will
directly influence future policy. However, PET predicts that there will be occasional
events that propel a massive change in policy. By synthesizing ideas from PFT and PET
while comparing the USAF and RAAF fighter training programs, I worked to improve
military leaders’ and policy scholars’ understanding of the fighter pilot training policy
process that could lead to future improvements. The implementation of the F-35 program
may provide a catalyst of change to both the USAF and the RAAF in the near future.
There appears to be a dichotomy between how current RAAF and USAF training policies
influence future policy during large technological changes. The USAF and RAAF policy
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makers may structure their respective F-35 training programs based on the current F-16
and F-18 program policy feedbacks. Or new technology and the mingling of contrasting
cultures may create punctuated events that completely change the status quo in USAF
and RAAF fighter pilot training. By grounding this investigation of USAF and RAAF
fighter pilot training programs and culture in PFT and PET, I was able to
comprehensively compare each program.
Qualitative Approach
The study was a qualitative, comparative, multi-case study of the USAF F-16 and
RAAF F-18 training programs. It is important to note that I used quantitative concepts
such as ratios of academic, simulator, and flying events throughout the study. However,
quantitative data alone did not allow me to adequately address the research questions.
Instead, I used the qualitative approach to explore not only the training programs, but also
the culture and resulting policy differences between the USAF and RAAF. Fighter pilot
training is as much an art as it is a science (Coe & Schmitt, 1997; Hampton, 2013; 2014).
It was important that I had the flexibility to explore the topic with an open-ended format
for comparison rather than to structure a quantitative comparison that did not have the
adaptability to explore the idiosyncrasies that define different training policies. The
USAF and RAAF use of single and dual seat aircraft during their respective training
programs is an example of the differences that are discussed in future chapters. The
majority of USAF F-16 training sorties are primarily flown solo while the RAAF F-18
sorties often include a dual seat aircraft with an instructor in the back seat (Hampton,
2013; Williams, 2001). The differing training styles and resulting psychological
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influences affect the instructional delivery techniques. As a result, they have an impact on
the content of the training program. A qualitative approach allowed me to more fully
explore the differences. The programs may seem very similar from a policy perspective.
However, from a cultural and implementation perspective the programs were different
even if they followed similar training models. The qualitative approach provided more
appropriate tools for identifying and explaining these subtleties.
Methodology
This was a qualitative case study with the primary data collection consisting of
document review (abstracting) of the USAF and RAAF training syllabi. To begin, I
examined the intent of each portion of the course. After reviewing the basic objectives
and content of the training policies, I was better able to understand the differences and
specific values and factors that were critical in the development of current fighter pilot
training policy.
It is important to note the document review did not tell the entire story, and some
triangulation techniques (Yin, 2011) were required. For example, 12 email interviews
with RAAF and USAF students, instructors, and previous exchange officers were
required to provide context for the study. I recruited the participants from a convenience
sample for several reasons. First, I was in Arizona at the time of data collection with
limited availability to correspond with former exchange officers or RAAF student pilots
in person. Therefore, the interview format consisted of a questionnaire (Appendix C) that
was administered via email. I used my experience and understanding of the RAAF and
USAF to select RAAF student pilots who had similar experience levels for comparison
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with the USAF student pilots. The training pipelines are very different between the USAF
and RAAF. For example, a typical USAF F-16 student usually has only completed 1-2
years of flying training before arriving at the F-16 schoolhouse. In contrast, the RAAF
student likely has completed 4-5 years of training before arriving at F-18 training. Due to
a need to minimize the research footprint on the USAF and RAAF target populations, I
conducted only 12 interviews. The interviews were only necessary to provide cultural
context to the prime policy sources, which were the respective RAAF and USAF syllabi.
Ethical Concerns
My goal in this study was to focus primarily on document analysis for the
research. There are many concerns and requirements when conducting primary research
through interviews, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, and implementation of
strict safeguards for human participants. The 12 interviews provided perspective on each
of the programs beyond what was written in the program documents. For example, the
culture of each organization played a significant role in how the programs were
administered. I was able to gather rich and insightful data on each program while also
ensuring that I met ethical guidelines while interacting with participants.
As an USAF pilot, I brought a level of bias to the study. Having spent many years
in the USAF and only one tour in the RAAF had an impact on how I interpreted each
program. I purposely decided to conduct the study after finishing the F-18 training
program in order to provide distance from the experience before trying to objectively
analyze the information.

12
Key Abbreviations and Definitions
ACM: Air combat maneuvering (Hampton, 2013).
Air-to-air training: Mission focused on combat tactics versus other aerial target
(Hampton, 2013).
Air-to-ground training: Mission focused on delivery of air to ground weapons
(Hampton, 2013).
BFM: Basic fighter maneuvering (Hampton, 2013).
BSA: Basic surface attack (Hampton, 2013).
CAS: Close air support (Hampton, 2013).
CFACC: Combined forces air component commander (Hampton, 2014).
DCA: Defensive counter air (Hampton, 2013).
Fighter pilot culture: Cultural dynamics within fighter pilot organizations
(Hampton, 2014).
Hornet: F-18 nickname (Hampton, 2014).
Learning style theory: The theory that student learning can be improved by
identifying students’ preferred learning style and then focusing study time towards study
methods that fit the preferred learning style (Hawk & Shah, 2007).
Lightning: F-35 nickname (Maldonado, 2015).
OPSAT: Opposed surface attack tactics (Hampton, 2013).
SAT: Surface attack tactics (Hampton, 2013).
Transition training: Training designed to teach the basics of takeoff, landing,
acrobatics, and emergency handling (Hampton, 2013).
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VARK Model: Visual, auditory, read/write, and kinesthetic learning model (Hawk
& Shah, 2007).
Viper: F-16 nickname (Hampton, 2013).
Assumptions
This study is unclassified. I used fighter-training syllabi from the USAF and
RAAF as the primary sources of information because syllabi served as the most clear and
stable means to explain how fighter pilot training programs are structured and
implemented. The syllabi are for official use only documents; therefore, the documents
cannot be released outside of the government, but the information taken from the syllabi
and presented in this study is unclassified and has no restrictions on its use.
The differences in language use between the USAF and RAAF are extensive. For
example, the equivalent of an F-16 instructor pilot in the USAF would be an F-18 BMQ,
B Category pilot in the RAAF. In order to avoid focusing on the semantics and the fact
that the main audience for the study will be in the United States, I have used USAF terms
to translate between the RAAF and USAF systems. The challenge with this is that RAAF
members might be confused when I use USAF terms to describe a qualification, program,
or event in the RAAF system. This translation streamlined the flow of information and
set a consistent standard throughout the study.
Scope and Delimitations
The USAF and RAAF pilot training, operational training, and weapons instructor
course training programs are all very different in content and philosophy. There is
potential for future study of each of these programs that would complement this study. In
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this study, I examined the USAF Air Education and Training Command (AETC) F-16
training program and the RAAF Classic F-18 training course. The primary reason this
data set was chosen is because each syllabus has a well-defined document that
communicated how each program was administered. Although many other fighter pilot
training programs in the USAF and RAAF are similar, they are not as well defined as
introductory training courses.
PFT and PET are met with varying levels of support and resistance within the
academic community (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). However, each theory served a specific
purpose to aid in the comparative framework for this study. There are other theories such
as multiple streams, the advocacy framework, and narrative policy theory that could add
value in future research when comparing fighter pilot training programs, but these were
either a poor fit or beyond the scope of this study. Learning style theory was also
beneficial for this study because it provided an easily identifiable framework to use for
comparison between the two programs. The differences in effectiveness of a PowerPoint
slide designed for a visual learner versus a lecture designed for an auditory student was
not my focus in the study. Instead, this study’s most beneficial aspects for policy makers
and future researchers stem from evaluating how and why each air force develops fighter
training policy, and from identifying and explaining the cultural differences that shape
those decisions.
Limitations
The biggest limitation for the study was access to information. The USAF and
RAAF operate with unique security regulations and standard operating procedures
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(SOPs). Many of these security restrictions are very different between each respective air
force. For example, the RAAF agreed to grant access to the policy, overview, and
administrative portions of the syllabus but not the specific flight details of each ride.
However, I did not have the same restriction when accessing the USAF syllabus.
Fortunately, the scope of this study only required access to the policy and administrative
portions of the RAAF syllabus. For example, I explored the weight of effort, types of
training methods, and instructor delivery methods rather than comparing specific tactical
differences in training content. Furthermore, my addition of the interviews to the study
helped further facilitate the comparison and provided insight into the training policy
process. The comparison remained within the constraints of the military information
handling process.
Significance
I designed the multi-case comparative analysis of the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
training program to explore how different training policies impact the effectiveness and
efficiency of the training programs. The USAF and RAAF approach fighter pilot training
differently, and exploring those differences may lead to new knowledge to help improve
USAF fighter pilot training. The comparative analysis exposed some of these differing
techniques that may lead to future USAF policy improvements. Improving fightertraining programs will help the USAF remain a good steward of taxpayer money by
maximizing capability at the lowest possible cost. The study may provide policy makers
new information that could be beneficial in shaping future training policy decisions.
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Summary
In this chapter I provided an overview of the study to justify the utility of the
analysis by defining the problem statement, developing research questions, and
explaining the theoretical framework that was used in the qualitative analysis to facilitate
the comparison. USAF flying and program terminology was used as the baseline to
compare the USAF and RAAF training programs. Throughout this dissertation, I have
used plain English as much as possible to maximize the number of stakeholders that
could use the information in the study while limiting confusion related to terminology
differences between the USAF and RAAF. Finally, the entire study remained at an
unclassified level.
A major challenge to this study was the complexity of comparing different
organizations that take a pilot with limited tactical flying experience and turn him or her
into a proficient fighter pilot. In the following literature review in Chapter 2, I present a
means to objectively compare each program from a policy perspective. It is important to
note that the comparative tools were not perfect, nor were the comparisons between the
training programs. However, understanding the literature and research methods used by
others to evaluate policy phenomenon helped provide the needed context for the study
and a manageable way to organize complex information.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The United States and Australia are loyal strategic allies and have worked
together during many major conflicts over the past 100 years. As a result, the USAF and
RAAF have a shared heritage of cooperation through the development and evolution of
western airpower at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of warfare. USAF and
RAAF leadership have indicated that fighter aircraft capability is a critical component of
an effective combat air force (Maldonado, 2015; William, 2001). Australia purchased F18s in 1985 to serve as the backbone of its fighter force (William, 2001). In the U.S.
DoD, only the Navy and Marines fly the F-18, which is important because the missions
of an air force and a navy are often very different at the operational and tactical level. The
USAF purchased the F-16 in the late 1970s to serve as the primary USAF multi-role
fighter (Hampton, 2013). Different cultures coupled with different aircraft have resulted
in USAF and RAAF fighter training policies that achieve the same end in very different
ways (Chapman & Colegrove 2013; William, 2001). This distinction is important
because Australia has decided to purchase and share in the development of the fifth
generation JSF as its replacement to the aging F-18. The USAF will also replace many of
its F-16s with the JSF. The USAF and RAAF are currently working together to develop a
new fighter pilot training policy to usher in the JSF (Allied Force Headquarters [AFHQ],
2014). The shared program will potentially forge a stronger bond and improved
interoperability between two very different air forces. With the intent of improving future
USAF fighter training polices, I conducted this study to better understand the fighter pilot
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training policy process by comparing the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory
training courses. This comparison is important because new information generated in this
analysis could help policy makers better manage resources and potentially save taxpayer
dollars in the effort to train future pilots.
The USAF may seek to incorporate the best practices of USAF and RAAF fighter
pilot training as it develops the JSF training policy. For example, current western fighter
pilot training programs consist of a mix of academic classes, simulator sessions, and
flight training (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014; Linquist, 2015). Training policy authors must
blend each of these components into a program that balances resource and technological
constraints, instruction techniques, student learning abilities, and safety concerns in order
to develop competent new fighter pilots (Beigh, 2006; Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014;
Linquist, 2015). The unforgiving nature of tactical aviation requires USAF and RAAF
policy makers to continuously evaluate the methods used to construct fighter pilot
training policy (Chapman & Colegrove, 2013). There are many competing as well as
complementary policy theories scholars use to define and understand how and why
policies are developed, change, and impact the organization and its associated stake
holders (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). PFT and PET are widely used to explain and
understand the policy process (Cairney, 2013a; Givel, 2010; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
PFT provides insight into how existing policy influences stakeholders to create future
policy. Meanwhile, PET focuses on the long periods of static policy that become
engrained in an organization compared with occasional catalysts that drive rapid change
in an organization (Baumgartner et al., 2014). There is a dichotomy within organizations
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that leverage current operating practices to develop new policy but then also occasionally
undergo radical change during a punctuated event that is fundamentally different from
previous policy. Examples of a punctuated event include new technology, ideas, or a
political directive that rapidly generates policy change with little regard for prior
institutional restraints. By melding concepts from both PFT and PET, I sought to further
explain and improve scholarly understanding of the development process of public policy
(Cairney, 2013b).
PFT and PET are two of many theories scholars have developed to explain the
policy process and that I deemed relevant to my study. Cairney (2013a) advocated for the
importance of combining multiple approaches from varying theories to model and
understand the complexity of many public policies. Together, PFT and PET served as a
lens I used to compare the USAF and RAAF training programs to improve understanding
of the policy process and the factors that impact the evolution of public policy.
Specifically, I reviewed resource allocation and organizational structure as well as
academic, flight, simulator, and instructional techniques to explore the fundamental
components of current 4th generation fighter pilot training policy.
In this chapter I summarize the current literature concerning PFT and PET as they
apply to previous comparative policy studies so that key concepts of the theories can be
used to compare, contrast, and ultimately better understand the dynamics of USAF and
RAAF training policy. In order to provide context, additional policy theories are
mentioned in this discussion, as I do not assert that PFT and PET are the only theories
that could apply to the study of fighter pilot training policy. Additionally, detailed
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information is provided to explore the components of the training programs that comprise
training policies. The current F-16 and F-18 programs structure training events to
stimulate student’s visual, auditory, and kinesthetic means of learning through reading,
lectures, testing, simulator sessions, and flight-based training (Chapman & Colegrove,
2013). Understanding the dynamics of the learning process in tactical aviation is
important to understanding how current training policy could influence future training
policy (Chapman & Colegrove, 2013; Hawk & Shah, 2007). Learning style theory is
introduced as a means to understand the learning process used in fighter training
program. I used it as a tool to categorize the training program components in order to
fully analyze the USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training policy development processes.
My aim was not to only compare and contrast policy theories or training techniques but
also to compare and synthesize two countries’ fighter pilot training programs in order to
improve future training policy. I used PFT and PET as the primary building blocks to
construct the needed foundation to conduct a scholarly comparison of two unique fighter
pilot training policies.
A critical consideration in this study of fighter pilot training programs was not
only the policy, curriculum, aircraft, maintenance, instructors and students, but also the
respective professional and national cultures that influence the organizations and,
therefore, the resulting policies. The fighter pilot community has developed its own
culture through its century long evolution (Carlson, 2011; Coe & Schmitt, 1997; Ennels,
2002). Therefore, I offer a brief synopsis of current literature concerning fighter pilot
culture to explain how many of the training decisions are made. Many aviation rules,
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regulations, and procedures are commonly referred to as having been “written in blood.”
It therefore takes a vast amount of effort to change policy and culture within aviation
organizations (Coe & Schmitt, 1997; Ennels, 2002). Policy makers must constantly
evaluate if a practice is in place for a valid reason or if it has remained in place simply
because that is the way the organization has always operated (Chapman & Colegrove,
2013). Fortunately, the USAF and RAAF have taken great strides in documenting the
intent, goals, and structure of their fighter pilot training programs in order to standardize
current training, and this documentation is beneficial when comparing each organization
(Chapman & Colegrove, 2013; Williams, 2001).
Before diving directly into the body of literature on PFT, PET, learning theory,
fighter pilot culture, and previous research related to training policy, I summarize the key
portions of the search strategy used to identify the theoretical foundation of each
respective theory. After defining and explaining PFT, PET, and relevant learning theory
concepts, I briefly address the theoretical foundation of the study and its relationship to
the comparative analysis of the fighter pilot training programs and resulting training
policy. Additionally, I demonstrate how a synthesis of literature on PFT, PET, learning
theory, flying training policies, and fighter pilot culture supported my qualitative multicase study (see Yin, 2011). I then summarize the major themes of the literature and
explain how the resulting study fills a knowledge gap in fighter pilot training policy
formulation. Finally, I provide justification for the research methods used in the study.
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Literature Search Strategy
I separated the literature research strategy into four distinct portions as each
portion served a specific role in the study. First, PFT followed by PET are addressed in
order to structure the comparison between the F-16 and F-18 policy. Second, I address
current training structure through the lens of learning theories focusing on visual,
auditory, and kinesthetic learning techniques to better define how a training program is
structured. Third, I discuss USAF and RAAF fighter pilot culture in order to provide
context for how each organization develops its policy and implements the training.
Fourth, a review of current literature concerning pilot training policy and pilot training
programs is included to establish a baseline of existing knowledge that this study will
build upon. I was unable to find extensive academic studies addressing the fighter pilot
training policy process and have included analogous studies addressing airline and
general aviation flying training policy processes to include examples and analogs that
have parallels to the military training process. There is potential to expand this research
stream to other career fields including high-stress performance-based training such as
medicine, police, fire, rescue, and other segments of the military. However, I took care to
avoid diluting the aim of the study, which was to focus primarily on the world of tactical
fighter military aviation.
I used Ebscohost Premier and Sage policy search engines as the primary means to
gather information. Google Scholar was also used to survey the depth of information
available on the policy subject and to fill in gaps in fighter pilot training and culture that
are missing in the typical academic search engines. Keywords in my searches included:
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policy feedback theory, punctuated equilibrium theory, policy theory, public policy,
fighter pilot training, airline pilot training, pilot training, pilot culture, fighter pilot
culture, airline pilot culture, learning style theory, learning theory, comparison of
Australia and the U.S., comparative studies, military training, comparative military
training, F-16 training, F-18 training, Joint Strike Fighter training, coalition training,
and organizational culture.
Theoretical Foundation
The study of public policy is a dynamic and complex endeavor because of the
infinite number of variables that potentially define the policy environment. Culture,
organizational mandates, stakeholder interests, and resource allocation are just a few of
the dynamics that influence public policy. In the fighter pilot training community,
different western fighter training programs with similar missions and goals develop very
different training programs, which drastically influences training policy development and
execution. Specifically, the USAF F-16 training program, culture, and execution is
different from RAAF F-18 training, although each has a mandate to develop missionready multi-role single seat fighter pilots who are poised to operate in a coalition
environment. In order to understand why the policies are different it is necessary to
examine each program’s training policies as they relate to prominent policy theories to
better understand the policy process and, more importantly, the outcomes.
PFT and PET have become important lenses through which to view public policy
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014) and provide context to better understand the training policy
phenomenon. Multiple streams, advocacy coalition, and narrative policy frameworks are
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additional perspectives to evaluate public policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). It seems
restrictive to classify the policy process by a single model. Cairney (2013b) advocated for
a more comprehensive approach by integrating multiple policy theories to gain better
understanding of a policy phenomenon. A theoretical synthesis approach is not
necessarily a compromise of multiple theories, but instead an opportunity to explore (a)
how the construct of a policy model ebbs and flows as a situation changes, and (b) how
different facets of a policy are interconnected. The synthesis approach provides the policy
scholar additional tools to understand phenomena within the realm of public policy
(Cairney, 2013b). In this study, I specifically explored the USAF and RAAF fighter
training policy, and my synthesis of PFT and PET provided a construct to evaluate the
policy of two different organizations.
The PFT approach could help explain the consistency in USAF and RAAF
training policy (Coe & Schmitt, 1997; William, 2001). Although PET will be discussed
later, I should now note that proponents predict that occasional punctuated events propel
massive change in policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The implementation of the F-35
program could provide such a catalyst to both the USAF and the RAAF in the next 5
years of the policy process. A blending of PFT and PET concepts may help explain the
training policy transition. While I may not have developed a method to predict future
policy decisions based on previous policy processes, the comparison through the lens of
PFT and PET was designed to improve understanding of USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
policies, which could help policy makers improve future training programs.
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PFT and PET Defined
The basic premise of policy feedback theory focuses on how current and past
policies influence future policy decisions and more importantly the actors that make
policy decisions (Allerdice, 2011; Baumgartner & Jones, n.d.; Mettler & Sorelle, 2014).
This dynamic is important when exploring the USAF and RAAF as both are large
complex organizations and are influenced by current policy and procedures when
developing new policy (Allerdice, 2011). Policy feedback loops can influence which
stakeholders are empowered and which are marginalized by a new policy (Mettler &
Sorelle, 2014). These direct and indirect outcomes impact how future policy decisions are
made. For example, the introduction of the GI Bill increased political participation in the
United States as a result of increased economic opportunity as service members took
advantage of educational opportunities following World War II (Mettler & Sorelle,
2014). Allerdice (2011) found that based on policy feedbacks the refugee integration
system in the United States and Australia to be very different in assimilating Sudanese
refugees into each respective country. It is not the specific outcomes of Allerdice’s
(2011) study that are most important but instead her research process shows that
Australian and U.S. policy feedbacks play a significant role in how stakeholders react to
policy. Additionally, Allerdice (2011) showed that a disruptive event such as a Sudanese
crisis could rapidly create a new policy that creates new policy feedbacks. This dynamic
of stability and punctuated change can have a significant effect on the policy process and
how stakeholders react to the policy (Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). The USAF and RAAF
multi-case study will also explore the differences in U.S. and Australian policy
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development. Using concepts from previous U.S. and Australian comparative policy
studies that illustrate the PFT process, and indirectly PET concepts, strengthens the
validity of this study’s theoretical framework.
Punctuated equilibrium theory is a robust tool to understand the policy process on
its own (Baumgartner et al., 2014; Givel, 2010). For example, the civil rights movement
or the events of September 11, 2001 highlight how a dramatic event can completely
reshape policy that results in a new paradigm. However, the punctuated event does not
occur in a vacuum and no matter how influential the event, a previous policy or practice
will likely influence outcomes (Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). This dynamic is used to
understand why the USAF and RAAF have developed their current policies, to help
identify what events may create tipping points in policy development, and how the inertia
and entanglements both good and bad of previous policies will re-define the new status
quo (Gladwell, 2008 Hampton, 2014; Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). The competing and
complementary forces of PFT and PET in the RAAF and USAF policy process will form
the framework to evaluate each program.
PFT and PET Origins
Policy feedback theory is a relatively new method of evaluating the policy process
as much of its support has been constructed in the past 25 years. However, as early as
1935 Schattschiender (as cited in Mettler & Sorelle, 2014) explained how new policies
influence new politics. In 1972, Lowe reinvigorated the idea and Anderson again
promoted the idea in 1990 during an analysis of welfare states’ effect on stakeholders
(Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). However, during the late 1980s and early 1990s there was
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resurgence in the policy feedback construct that continues today (Mettler & Sorelle,
2013). Policy feedback theory is extensive and is not defined by a singular argument.
Mettler and Sorelle (2014) explained that PFT has evolved into a multiple streams
approach including meaning of citizenship, form of governance, power of groups, and
political agendas as tools to model public policy development. This study will primarily
focus on three streams. First the governance stream is used to understand the mandate,
missions, and requirements for USAF and RAAF pilot training policy. Second, the power
of groups stream is addressed because specific stakeholders that are involved in the
fighter pilot training process are important in understanding the training policy process.
Finally, the political agenda stream is reviewed to better understand the political
influences such as national and personal motives that drive changes in pilot training
policy.
Punctuated equilibrium theory explains that most policy situations are defined by
stability, but in times of dynamic change, or even crisis, large changes can occur that
restructure the status quo (Baumgartner et al., 2014). This construct is very much in line
with Gladwell’s (2008) tipping point theory as well as Taleb’s (2010) black swan model
that helps explain the dynamic between stability and drastic change. This is not to say
that policy does not develop incrementally, only that there is a relationship between
stability and change that many other theories do not recognize. Schattschnieder (as cited
in Sabatier & Weible, 2014) played a role in explaining the difficulty of marginalized
groups in influencing the establishment with new ideas; however, Baumgartner and Jones
(n.d) are credited with aggressively advocating punctuated equilibrium concepts in the
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study of American politics. Jones, Thomas, and Wolfe (2014) addressed the PET debate
by explaining that the policy process as a bubble that expands, contracts, and
occasionally bursts based on the inputs and outputs that drive the policy process. My
comparative multi-case study will explore the relationship of the current training policies
within the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 communities to better understand the potential for
drastic changes with the development of new technologies. This endeavor has the
potential to help future policy makers and scholars understand the dynamics that shape
fighter pilot training across a large spectrum of western fighter pilot training programs.
Punctuated equilibrium theory in the policy arena is used similarly as the theory
of evolution and adaptation is used in the study of biology. Adaptation is often slow or
non-existent until a particular stimulant creates an environment that promotes a rapid
change. Moving away from the natural sciences discussion towards the evolution of
policy allows one to explore many examples of stable public policy being completely
changed as a result of a new event, technology, or dynamic (Baumgartner et al., 2014).
An example in the USAF would include the development of air-to-air refueling
capability, which allowed tactical aircraft with an unlimited fuel range to strike deeper
targets and provide more persistence in the battle space as a result of new technology.
This change allowed the USAF to restructure how it applies air power and the many
different policies that are required to define and support it (Hampton, 2014; Olds et al.,
2010).
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PFT and PET Hypotheses and Delineations of Assumptions
Before attempting to meld the concepts of PFT, PET, learning theory, and fighter
pilot cultural dynamics into a comprehensive explanation of the RAAF and USAF fighter
pilot training policy process it is necessary to briefly explain the hypotheses and
delineations of each theory. This exercise will serve as a basis of comparison with other
leading public policy theories and will provide support for the author’s decision to bound
the policy comparison through the lens of PFT and PET. As previously discussed, policy
feedback theory governance, power of groups, and political agenda aspects are the
primary focus for the study.
PFT governance stream. The governance stream predicts that polices, once
established, will often affect future governance (Mettle & Mallory, 2014). This
delineation is the corner stone of PFT and therefore may seem a bit repetitive in this
chapter but it is important because it has many potential impacts on large bureaucratic
organizations such as the USAF and RAAF. Standard operating procedures, directives,
and multiple forms of official documentation shape, define, and influence current
responsibilities in the organization and greatly impact the scope all respective
stakeholders have in defining the future of an organization. As an example, Mettle and
Mallory (2014) explained that because the Social Security Administration (SSA) earned a
reputation for efficient administration of retirement programs this motivated lawmakers
to expand the SSA authority to also help administer the Medicare program. Thereby
increasing the influence of the SSA as a result of feedbacks within the policy process.
This distinction is important considering the future of the JSF program, as there are many
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different fighter communities that have an interest in shaping the new policy. How the
directive policy is written and administrated could impact the direction of the future
policy based on the stakeholders that are empowered by the new policy.
PFT power of groups. The power of groups plays a role in how the USAF and
RAAF operate as organizations. There are many different and often competing
organizations that seek additional control of resources and influence within the
organization. For example, during the Cold War the Strategic Air Command was a
dominant force in the USAF and focused its efforts and resources on building and
training a long-range strategic bomber force (Coe & Schmitt, 1997). As a result of the
Vietnam War there was a shift in the USAF towards tactical fighter aircraft due to
mission requirements during more limited operations in South East Asia, the Balkans,
and the Middle East (Hampton, 2014; Olds et al., 2010). The consequence was a shift in
the power structure in the USAF and a similar shift in power dynamics may occur in the
future as the political and military environment changes. For instance, as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) become more and more capable there is potential for a shift in power
structure in the USAF between manned and unmanned programs (Hampton, 2014). How
the current fighter and UAV communities adapt as a result of new programs such as the
F-35 may significantly impact future USAF policy and internal power dynamics.
PFT political agenda. Current and future USAF programs are not created merely
on calculated decisions of capability and cost-benefit analysis. There are multiple
competing agendas that influence the evolution of a program (Mettler & Sorelle, 2014).
A recent initiative by the DoD to retire the A-10 aircraft and to extend the F-16 and F-18
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lifetime highlights this point (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO],
2012). The USAF proposed retiring the A-10 in order to reallocate resources to the F-35
program. However, the A-10 community and Army have a deep appreciation and respect
for the capabilities of the airframe and have resisted the move. Additionally,
congressional and senate leaders have resisted the plan out of concern for the impact on
civilian communities once A-10s are retired from Davis Montham AFB, Arizona
(Zengerle, 2014). From a policy perspective, these examples are beyond the scope of the
F-16 and F-18 comparison, however, they are used to highlight that individual political
agendas often impact the policy process and are a key element of policy feedback theory.
Learning and Training Theory
The basic premise of learning style theory is that individuals can be classified
according to a particular style of learning that best represents their learning strengths
(Panshler, McDaniel & Bjork, 2008). Flemming and Mills’ (1992) visual auditory
read/write and kinesthetic sensory (VARK) model was one of the most common and
widely used models to explain how individuals learn (Hawk & Shah, 2007). The concept
was built upon the idea that individuals use different neuro-linguistic programing models
to learn most efficiently (Stahl, 1999; Zapalska & Brozik, 2007). There are many other
models that could be used to explore F-16 and F-18 training (Kavale & LeFever, 2007;
Kolb, 1984). In this study learning style theory was used because it is a readily accepted
training model and served as a means to develop a comprehensive program comparison.
Specifically, the VARK model provided structure to the training comparison leading to a
policy comparison from a PFT, PET and fighter pilot culture perspective.
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The concept of learning modalities are a construct of learning style theory that
predicts that sensory preferences affect how an individual learns (Dunn, Beaudry &
Klavas, 1989). The F-16 and F-18 training programs include components of each mode
of the VARK model (Hampton, 2013). One interpretation of learning style theory would
suggest that a read-and-write oriented pilot could read a flight manual and then gain all
the information they required to fly an airplane. In reality, this tactic would likely lead to
disaster (Beigh, 2006). Another plausible interpretation of the theory would suggest that a
read-and-write oriented student would be most successful by blending all components of
the VARK model but using written material as the corner stone of the learning process
(Panshler et al., 2008; Romanelli, Bird & Ryan, 2009; Stahl, 1999). The policy maker
may gain further insight into training policy development by understanding these
distinctions because training programs are often ridged, time compressed, and
standardized to leverage preferred learning modalities (Carlson, 2011; Hampton, 2014).
USAF and RAAF Fighter Pilot Culture
An important aspect of the study was defining and understanding how USAF and
RAAF fighter pilot cultures impact the training philosophy. For example, the USAF F-16
training program is highly defined by a single seat aircraft mentality and the training
program is designed so that all sorties could be accomplished in a single seat plane.
However, USAF policy makers do currently dictate the use of dual seat F-16 trainers and
mandate an instructor pilot fly in the back seat in certain sorties. The syllabus has to be
structured so that the student is not overwhelmed by the training and is able to safely
accomplish the training tasks without a safety monitor in the aircraft.
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In contrast, the RAAF classic F-18 training program has eighty percent of its
sorties flown in a two seat aircraft with an instructor in the back seat. The significance of
this difference is that after graduation all USAF F-16 and RAAF Classic F-18 flying will
be accomplished single seat. The RAAF adopts a different training philosophy by
ramping up the training intensity in the early stages and pushing the student to the very
limits of their ability with the understanding that if the student is pushed too far that there
is an instructor in the back seat to step in if a dangerous situation develops (William,
2001). I will compare and contrast this unique difference in culture, which is important
because the end result of both programs is a single seat fighter pilot.
These subtle differences in training philosophy are not something that can be
easily researched in academic journals or typical academic means. Therefore, I expanded
my search to include lectures, conversations, stories, and programs to present a more
comprehensive understanding of the importance of a unique fighter pilot culture that
impacts the development and execution of the fighter pilot training syllabus. The goal is
to use additional resources to compliment the more structured policy and training
research concerning PFT, PET, and learning theory.
Theoretical Guidance
PET and PFT Frameworks
The difference in approach to this study compared to earlier PFT and PET studies
exploring the GI Bill, refuge assimilation, and tobacco reform is that there is an effort to
synthesize several popular models of studying public policy rather than examining public
policy models as discrete or linear processes (Baumgartner & Jones, n.d.; Mettler &
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Welch, 2014). Goss (2010) advocated the importance of developing multi-aspect models
when examining policy feedbacks and argued that many earlier policy studies focused on
sections of policy phenomenon in a linear fashion and did not synthesize constructs from
differing theoretical perspectives to better understand the policy process. Cairney (2013b)
went so far to say that restricting the collaboration of different frameworks within the
qualitative inquiry by trying to develop rigid scientific testing standards in the study of
policy may harm future understanding of the policy process. Furthermore, there is a
problem when the study of public policy is divided into groups of scholars studying
different parts of the same process (Baumgartner & Jones, n.d). For example, the
evolution of the GI Bill, Medicare, welfare reform, and tobacco reform are all examples
that show both positive and negative policy feedback loops during slow and fast change
(Baumgartner & Jones, n.d.; Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). Examining the events within the
policy feedback process during stable and dynamic events is the means in which one may
study public policy while using the PFT and PET models cooperatively. Furthermore, a
thorough understanding of public policy should include an awareness of the impact of
institutions and individuals in structuring behavior; but that behavior is subject to
occasional change under certain circumstances (Givel, 2010; Goss, 2010; Patashnik &
Zelizer, 2010).
Learning Theory and Training Techniques
Learning style theory in the academic community and what are the best training
techniques within the fighter pilot community are both controversial topics (Coe &
Schmitt, 1997; Kavale & LeFever, 2007). There are many learning style theories and two
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of the most researched are Kolb’s (1984) experiential model and Fleming’s VARK model
(Kavale & LeFever, 2007; Manolis, Burns, Assudan, & Chinta, 2013; Romanelli et al,
2009). Fleming’s VARK model is used in this study as a means of comparing the F-16
and F-18 training programs. Although the research to support claims of the VARK model
is inconclusive and other learning style theories could be used it is important to note that
many western fighter training programs structure curriculum too include many aspects of
the VARK model (Hampton, 2013). Therefore, the model provides a useful tool to dissect
the training events for comparison between the F-16 and F-18 programs and meets the
needs of the study design.
Fighter Pilot Culture
Fighter pilot is an attitude. It is cockiness. It is aggressiveness. It is selfconfidence. It is a streak of rebelliousness, and it is competitiveness. But
there's something else - there's a spark. There's a desire to be good. To do
well; in the eyes of your peers, and in your own mind. (Olds, , n.d.)
Robin Olds was one of the most famous USAF fighter pilots from World War II
and the Vietnam War. His legacy continues to impact the fighter pilot community today
(Hampton, 2014). Based on the dangerous nature of tactical flying there are many written
and unwritten rules, codes, and standard practices that are common in fighter pilot
organizations. This study was not designed to focus extensively on fighter pilot culture;
however, an introduction to the topic is important in understanding how and why many
fighter pilot training programs are structured the way they are. Hampton (2013, 2014)
and Olds (2010) explained that the fighter pilot community is ultra-competitive and much
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of its training requires direct and often brutal feedback while under intense pressure. As a
result of the stressful environment many fighter organizations have complicated social
dynamics that ultimately impact the training process. This study will seek to explore
some of the cultural dynamics that influence fighter training policy.
Previous Research
Theories. Many of the current studies reviewing PFT and PET are singular case
studies. Unfortunately, no military studies of training programs that addressed PFT or
PET could be located. However, topics to include Medicare, welfare, GI Bill, and the
civil rights movement were explored to review the PFT and PET concepts within other
domains of public policy (Baumgartner et al., 2014; Cairney, 2013a; Givel, 2010; Mettler
& Sorelle, 2014). The underlying themes within each of these studies was of a continuum
of policy feedback loops that influenced future policy by shaping and influencing the
actions of stakeholders with the need to explain sporadic and unpredictable radical
change. For instance, a GI Bill study was used as an example of how introducing the GI
Bill following World War II gave veterans new opportunities that may have increased the
percentage of veterans that became politically active in their respective communities
(Mettler & Sorelle, 2014). However, there is an argument that the policy process is more
complex than the PFT model and that punctuated events need to be considered (Givel,
2010). This study explored how policy feedbacks within the fighter pilot training
community influenced current policy and may shape future policy while recognizing the
need to account for punctuated events that could rapidly change training policy.
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The multi-case study is a valid research design used by scholars to study the
policy process (Yin, 2011). For example, Allerdice (2011) conducted a multi-case study
comparing the validity of PFT during Sudanese immigrant experiences in the United
States and Australia. Allerdice (2011) explained that the Sudanese immigrants received
different feedbacks from Australian and United States stakeholders, which directly
influenced the immigrants’ political participation in each respective country. My study
attempts to explore two policy theories within a multi-case study to see if expected
outcomes are complemented by the synthesis of each theory within the policy process in
a real world scenario. The Australian and United States multi-case comparative study of
Sudanese immigrants is good validation of the utility of the proposed model. However,
the variables are very different and the Sudanese study will not be used as the primary
blue print for this multi-case study.
Although many current public policy studies focus on the exploration of a
singular theory many researchers are now advocating exploring the policy process from a
multi-faceted approach to further develop the policy process from multiple viewpoints
(Cairney, 2013a; Givel, 2010). Givel (2010) cautioned that approaching and evaluating
singular policy theories would likely oversimplify or limit understanding of extremely
complex relationships between multiple variables and strengthens the argument for the
importance of multi-faceted perspective.
An additional consideration is the use of learning theory as a classification tool
for the development of the study. The VARK model is controversial with many authors
having argued that there is limited empirical evidence to suggest that developing
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curriculum based upon learning models is effective (Kavale & LeFever, 2007; Panshler et
al., 2008). However, despite the criticism the education community frequently uses the
VARK model and other learning style theories to guide the education development
process (Romanelli et al, 2009; Smith, 2010). The utility of the VARK model in this
study is not used to justify or refute learning style models but to use the concepts as a
basis of comparison to understand the instructional processes within the RAAF and
USAF fighter pilot training curriculums. This allowed me to evaluate how the
instructional styles, fighter pilot culture, and political environment impacted the resulting
training policy.
Based on previous research there is reasonable evidence to suggest that PET and
PFT partially explains the development of and execution of public policy (Baumgartner
et al., 2014; Mettler & Sorelle, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). What has not been
examined specifically is how fighter pilot training policy is developed and what impact
the policy, culture, and political environment plays in the development of new policy in
the USAF and RAAF fighter community. Before examining the USAF F-16 and RAAF
F-18 training policies it was helpful to review previous training policy and training
studies.
Training policy. There was a consistent theme within current aviation training
policy literature, which focused primarily on a need to change existing training policy
based on technological improvements to aircraft systems and avionics. The airline
industry and military have both taken many steps to incorporate Crew Resource
Management (CRM) training at the earliest opportunity during training to focus not only
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on the skills of flying but also on the decision-making processes in aviation (Matton,
Raufaste & Vautier, 2013; Prince, Oser & Salas, 1993; Rigner & Dekker, 2000). The
reason for this is many of today’s aviation accidents are not the result of poorly
performed maneuvers or decisions but instead are typically the result of a loss of
situational awareness (SA). The loss of SA is based on misunderstanding the aviation
environment, which led to a series of poor decisions that ends in a safety incident (Matton
et al., 2013). There is an overwhelming amount of information to process in today’s
aircraft that it is very easy to misinterpret the surrounding environment and make
dangerous decisions based on incorrect identification of the problem (Matton et al, 2013).
The airlines have taken steps to introduce a CRM process in the cockpit to help aircrew
identify problems early and work together as a team to manage the aircraft systems to
improve safety. This potentially comes at a price as less resources are devoted to basic
aircraft flying skills and more of a focus on systems management of the aircraft (Casper,
Geven, & Williams 2013).
The USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 communities deal with very similar issues
because although the basic aircraft have not changed, the system capabilities, additional
sensors, and improved avionics have drastically changed the pilot’s cockpit tasks
(Hampton, 2014). Compounding the challenge is that the F-16 and classic F-18 are single
seat aircraft so many of the CRM processes adopted by the airlines have been modified to
apply between a flight lead and a wingman (Hampton, 2014). The result of these new
challenges is that training policy authors are trying to find new ways to improve aircraft
system management and ultimately SA without sacrificing basic aircraft handling skills.
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Banbury, Dudfield, Hoermann, and Soll (2007) attempted to quantify the importance of
SA training in improving aviation safety by developing a factors affecting situational
awareness (FASA) questionnaire to administer to pilots following a SA training program
compared with a control group that had not received the training. They found the process
to be successful and that the SA training improved pilot performance.
The USAF has also conducted studies to assess the validity of improved simulator
training such as the Distributed Mission Training (DMT) and the Distributed Mission
Operations (DMO) concepts as ways to expose pilots to more complex scenarios than a
pilot might encounter in combat or during emergency situations that cannot be
realistically replicated during training missions or in the class room (Chapman &
Colgrove, 2013). The results of the studies have influenced the USAF to expand its
training policy to more heavily incorporate simulator training (Chapman & Colgrove,
2013). Additionally, the Polish and Swedish Air Forces have conducted independent
studies showing the utility of simulator training in developing technical and decisionmaking skills (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014; Lunquist, 2015). The simulators have become
so realistic that much of the knowledge that used to be reinforced through repetitive
visual, auditory, and reading methods often referred to as “chair flying” can now be
reinforced more efficiently in the simulator (Croft, 2012). It is interesting to note that the
RAAF does not have comparable simulator capability to the USAF, which results in a
different style of training policy because each air force has different training capabilities.
However, much of the training policy currently being developed for the F-35 focuses
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more extensively on simulator training which will play a significant role in the
development of future training policy for both the RAAF and USAF (Insinna, 2014).
It would be easy for policy makers to dictate the need for more CRM, SA, and
simulator training as they develop new training policy but implementation becomes much
more complex. Casper et al., (2013) found that airline training often is conducted in
repetitive ways that led pilots to study and execute maneuvers in a routine manner but
when abnormal events were added without warning, pilot responses were less appropriate
and much more varied. Training that has a more complete treatment of abnormal events
is needed to help pilots practice recognizing events and applying the appropriate
response. Another study was conducted on an individual’s ability to deal with
unpredictable environments as a case study for pilot training (Matton et al, 2013). The
authors developed an individual differences test of multiple cue probability learning
(MCPL) to evaluate expected performance from pilots. They found that poor MCPL
performers experienced almost twice as many pilot training difficulties as better MCPL
performers (44% vs. 25%). This line of inquiry is very similar to the learning theory
discussion and although is beyond the scope of this study the findings and process could
be used to improve future training policy with the advent of improved training tools such
as better simulators and decision-making training.
Naidoo, Schaap, and Vermeulen (2014) also accomplished further work to
measure and assess perceptions of the advanced aircraft training climates. This is an
important consideration because it addresses how pilots received changes to training
policy after there have been organizational norms established. Not only does this concept
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address the challenges of developing training policy but also illustrates the PFT process
as the researchers evaluated how previous policy influenced future policy. Many policy
makers understand the need for a paradigm shift in training at the organizational level due
to the increases in automation and having an ability to measure pilot perceptions is a new
concept within the study of aviation training policy (Casper et al, 2013; Coe & Schmitt,
1997; Hampton, 2014). According to Naidoo et al., (2014) no prior scientific research has
been published about the advanced aircraft-training climate. Another important attribute
of the Naidoo et al., (2014) study was the examination of both the psychological and
organizational culture of the organization. The authors used organizational culture to
define the shared way in which members of the organization have learned to think about,
perceive, and consider organizational issues, tasks, and problems. The psychological
culture refers to the collective way individuals in the organization processed and reacted
to changes in policy (Naidoo et al., 2014). Finally, the climate in the study referred to an
advanced aircraft pilot’s cognitive and psychological processing of the aviation
environment as experienced within advanced aircraft. This study addresses both PFT and
fighter pilot culture. It is interesting to note that Naidoo et al., (2014) were looking at the
influence previous training policy and climate played in defining the training
environment. This discussion point is closely tied to how my study evaluated the
importance of fighter pilot culture during the establishment and administration of training
policy.
Training programs. The following section is used to provide the reader with
additional information concerning other fighter training programs that will not be used
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during the comparison of USAF and RAAF training programs. The information is
provided to show that many of the USAF and RAAF training policies are different from
other US and allied fighter training programs. For example, one might ask why not
compare RAAF F-18 training with United States Navy (USN) and Marine F-18 training
for a more direct 4th generation training policy comparison? However, while reviewing
USN F-18 training it is clear that much of the USN/USMC is more focused on maritime
operations than the respective USAF and RAAF training programs. Some of the specific
details of the Navy and Marine F-18 training include a 44 week course with 120 flight
hours and a similar number of simulators following a building block approach (Carlson,
2011). The training order is transition training, formation flying, basic radar introduction,
strike, close air support, and the air-to-air combat phase at the end of training, which is
very different in USAF and RAAF fighter training programs. This information is
provided as background as no specific research studies or USN and USMC training
policy could be located for inclusion in this study
For comparison, according to Lindquist (2015) Swedish fighter pilot training
began after pilots received approximately 280 training hours in basic aircraft. The fightertraining program included 4 months with 30 simulator hours, and 8 hours of theory
lessons. Next there were 80 hours of tactical flying with a new fighter pilot graduating
with approximately 110 fighter hours (Lindquist, 2015). It is important to note that
Lindquist (2015) expected that there would be a need to completely change the training
program when there are no longer two-seat aircraft available. This is also a concern with
the USAF and the RAAF with the development of the JSF.
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As previously mentioned, the Polish Air Force has also conducted research to
evaluate the importance of simulator training for their respective flying programs. The
Polish Air Force determined a formula of events that can be substituted in the simulator
as a result of studies related to the transfer of knowledge and skills from the simulator to
the aircraft. For example, the Polish Air Force determined that simulator training
decreased time required to solo by 1.5 hours. They also found that full motion flight
simulators did not add to the proficiency of the pilots and that the cost of motion
simulators was cost prohibitive. The overall findings were that modern flight simulators
drastically improve basic flight training efficiency (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). The
Polish Air Force uses simulators with a primary focus on improving aircraft handling
skills needed for aerial combat and allows pilots to train in scenarios that are too
expensive or too dangerous to do so in the air. All of the studies clearly showed a
significant benefit to using flight simulators for skill development (Kozuba & Bondaruk,
2014). Situational awareness training was also considered a key portion of the simulatortraining program.
From 1970-2004 70 percent of serious Polish Armed Force air incidents were the
result of insufficient pilot SA (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). The technological complexity
of modern aircraft make it extremely difficult to maintain SA. Simulator training in order
to build solid training habit patterns is important in training safety. The Polish training
structure can be broken into flight maneuver training, procedural training, and tactical
training (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). As an example, further analysis done by the Polish
Air Force found the simulators provided a high training effectiveness, maintained high
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standards of training safety, ensured availability, provided a repeatable medium for pilots
to practice likely airborne scenarios, and test new ideas and solutions. Furthermore, the
simulator optimized financial resources, reduced number of hours flown by trainee, and
helped the instructor focus purely on the trainee (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). The
disadvantages of the simulators included purchase price, insufficient level of
environmental impact on the trainee compared to real world operations, shorter flight
duration, and unrealistic radio traffic (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). The benefit of the
Polish training study and additional work on quantifying the effectiveness of simulators is
that much of the USAF and RAAF training policy does not document similar studies to
support the policy decisions. This is not to say that the decisions were made based on
anecdotal evidence but instead to highlight that there are many nations trying to optimize
their respective fighter training policy and there is an opportunity to leverage new
training ideas from the efforts of partner nations.
Summary and Conclusions
This study combines multiple theories to explore the fighter pilot training policy
process while accounting for the influences of culture and tradition within a unique
population. PFT and PET are relatively new policy theories and much of the existing
literature focuses on PFT and PET as individual phenomenon when exploring singular
case studies. Cairney explained the importance of a more holistic approach to policy
study in order to conduct a more thorough exploration of the policy process and I used a
similar approach to study USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 training policy.
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There is a gap in the current literature as there has not been a study to specifically
compare and contrast USAF and RAAF fighter training policy. This is important because
better understanding of the policy process within the fighter pilot training community
could provide policy maker’s new methods to improve future policy. Understanding these
dynamics may allow the fighter pilot community to seize new opportunities to improve
fighter pilot training and apply the lessons that other coalition partners have learned in
order to improve future USAF fighter pilot training.
The research gap provided me many opportunities to investigate the fighter pilot
training policy processes. There is certainly scope for future quantitative research to
isolate and measure the relationships between variables in future studies. However, a
multi-case study focusing on F-16 and F-18 syllabi as the primary research document
combined with exploration of fighter pilot culture, and dissection of training based on the
VARK model provided me robust tools to explore current fighter pilot training policy.
In Chapter 3 I will describe how the study was constructed as a qualitative
comparative multi-case study that examined training policy within the USAF and RAAF
fighter training squadrons. I examined quantitative concepts but the study is primarily
structured as a qualitative study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to compare and understand the differences between
the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policies, and my goal for the study
was to develop a better understanding of the fighter pilot training policy development
process. Considering the importance of this topic to national defense and the expense of
fighter-training programs, a study designed to better understand current fighter pilot
training policy development could help USAF leaders develop new policy that minimizes
costs and maximizes capability.
In this chapter, I review the main research question and sub-questions, define the
policy phenomenon, and explain the utility of a qualitative multi-case study that
compares F-16 and F-18 training policy. I am a USAF F-16 pilot who served an exchange
tour in a RAAF F-18 squadron. While most of the research came from source documents
and third-party interviews, I provided personal perspective based on my experience in
both the F-16 and F-18 programs. Furthermore, I explained how interview participants
were selected from a convenience sample and then offer detailed explanation of the
research process and abstracting methods I used to comparatively analyze primary
training policy documents. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the required
scholarly protocol to ensure all required ethical procedures were followed. These
protocols ensure the integrity of the study, protect the participants, and ensure that the
primary research questions were addressed through a credible, rigorous scholarly process.
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Research Design and Rationale
In this study, I developed and then addressed the following central research
question: What can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter pilot training policies reveal
about the best practices and optimal instructional approaches, to inform policy
development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training programs?
Sub-questions:
1. How influential are current RAAF and USAF policy practices in shaping the
development of future policy?
2.

What training techniques are perceived to be most effective and efficient to
train new fighter pilots as fighter aircraft technologies and training systems
advance?

3. What impact will new technologies such as aircraft upgrades, simulator
capability, and new aircraft have in shaping future policy?
PFT predicts that current policy will directly influence future policy, which could
help explain the dynamics of USAF and RAAF training policy. However, PET predicts
that occasional events can create drastic change in policy. The implementation of new
technology such as the development of the F-35 program could provide a catalyst for
fundamental change to both the USAF and the RAAF. There appears to be a dichotomy
between how current RAAF and USAF training policy feedbacks influence future policy
during large technological changes. A study investigating policy feedback, punctuated
equilibrium, as well as USAF and RAAF fighter pilot culture, allowed for a
comprehensive comparison of current USAF and RAAF fighter training policy.

49
This was a qualitative comparative multi-case study of the USAF F-16 and RAAF
F-18 training programs. Although I discuss some quantitative concepts, the research
questions were best explored from a qualitative perspective. Fighter pilot training is a mix
of art and science; therefore, I explored some of the unquantifiable aspects of the fighter
pilot community. For example, I explored the training program in conjunction with the
fighter pilot culture that influences the evolution and implementation of the training
program. The qualitative method allowed me to examine policy and cultural differences
between two fully functioning training programs without the need to manipulate variables
or be hindered by quantitative method limitations (Yin, 2011). It was important to have
the flexibility to explore the topic with an open-ended format to facilitate the comparison
rather than structure a quantitative study that would not have had the adaptability to
explore the idiosyncrasies that define different training policies (Yin, 2011). The
programs may appear very similar from a policy perspective, but from a cultural and
implementation perspective the programs are very different, even if they follow similar
models. The qualitative approach provided better tools to identify and explain these
subtleties (Yin, 2011).
Role of the Researcher
I am a USAF F-16 weapons officer and instructor pilot. This professional
experience included assignments as a chief instructor pilot at the USAF primary F-16
pilot training base as well as operational experience in front line USAF F-16 and RAAF
F-18 squadrons in support of the global war on terror (GWOT). Additionally, I recently
served a military personnel exchange program (MPEP) tour with a RAAF F-18 squadron
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and have undergone the full RAAF F-18 introductory training program. My primary role
as the researcher was to serve as the research instrument. The goal was to conduct the
majority of the research through comparative analysis of primary F-16 and F-18 training
policy documents, as they are the most stable and comprehensive data sources available.
However, there are many cultural idiosyncrasies, conflicting instructional strategies, and
unwritten rules that define and impact the development of a new fighter pilot. For
example, a brand-new fighter pilot, affectionately called a “punk” in the USAF and a
“bog rat" in the RAAF, is expected to not only learn the required skills to fly highly
maneuverable supersonic aircraft but also must learn to navigate the social dynamics of a
fighter squadron. In this study, I primarily drew upon third party interviews, informal
communication, and the writings of previous fighter pilots to explain these dynamics.
However, because of the many differences between the language and expectations of
USAF and RAAF fighter pilots, I interpreted and then translated these differences to
facilitate consistent data collection and effective analysis. The qualitative approach
allowed for the collection and analysis of policy and program information without
interfering with the operation of the current fighter training programs. However, I bring a
degree of personal bias to this translation because I have spent the majority of my
professional career in the USAF fighter pilot system and only a couple of years in the
RAAF system.
An important consideration to note when reviewing the USAF F-16 and RAAF F18 community is that both are relatively small when compared to the DoD community at
large. Further, I am now a part of both the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 communities.
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Each organization operates in a closely-knit, high-stress, competitive environment, and it
would be impossible to mitigate all of the personal relationships and potential for bias
within the study. However, many books and articles written by outsiders concerning the
fighter pilot community do not always capture the context and rationale for many of the
common practices within fighter squadrons. I am not using this discussion as a sounding
board to justify or argue against many of these dynamics, but only to highlight this
unique position to explain the dynamics of the USAF and RAAF fighter communities to a
wider audience.
I am not currently serving in a primary leadership role in the RAAF and have
recently returned to the F-16 community after several years. Many of the supervisory and
instructor-to-student relationships or other power differentials that would have been a
concern during previous assignments were minimized based on current circumstances. As
I mentioned in Chapter 1, I managed personal bias primarily by focusing the study on
policy documents.
A challenge during development of this study was gaining appropriate approvals
from the RAAF and USAF to conduct interview research and to use current training
policy documents. Fortunately, a primary goal of the U.S. military exchange program is
to develop relationships, improve communication, and improve the joint capabilities of
our trusted allies. The study may indirectly further that end for both the USAF and RAAF
and may contribute to policy scholars understanding of the policy process.

52
Methodology
Document Selection Logic
The primary data collection sources for this study were the USAF and RAAF
introductory course syllabi, which are the authoritative policy documents for each fighter
pilot training program. The documents provided course prerequisites, administrative
issues, course methodology, training structure, resource allocation, and course timelines.
The syllabi were essential in order to compare the programs. Additionally, the USAF
AETC and the RAAF equivalent organizations are the parent command structures that are
ultimately responsible for the administration of the courses. Each command publishes
additional policy documents beyond the syllabus to administer the course. These
documents were not reviewed during this study due to access limitations. After I had
conferred with the RAAF F-18 training commander, he requested that I would not fully
disclose the syllabus and the RAAF training model to prevent potential adversaries from
gaining a full picture of the Australian training psyche. In the spirit of this request, I do
not document the specific training locations or policy document names, and have
maintained the confidentiality of all interviewees. Furthermore, I did not have access to
the sortie-specific details of each training sortie that addresses specific tasks such as
weapons events or specific fighter tactics. These details were not necessary to address the
research questions because I was primarily focused on policy considerations rather than
tactical details. Many of the inconsequential details of course administration were not
highlighted in this study. However, most of this information is at the “unclassified” and
the “for official use only” level of classification. Therefore, future researchers should
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contact me with any specific questions concerning access to or classification status of
relevant USAF and RAAF documents.
A study of RAAF and USAF training policy would not be complete without the
perspective of participants who have experienced the training. In the following section, I
explain the rationale for selection of a cross section of F-16, F-18, and exchange pilots
that brought a different perspective of USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training.
Participant Selection Logic
The research population included current USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 pilots, and
a mix of exchange pilots who have undergone fighter pilot training in at least two
different air forces. The sampling strategy included a convenience sample using a written
interview instrument. The study included two RAAF F-18 pilots, one RAAF instructor
pilots, three USAF F-16 pilots, two USAF F-16 instructor pilots, one USAF F-15E pilot
who served as a RAAF F-18 pilot, and one RAAF F-18 pilot who served as a USAF F-22
exchange officer. This convenience sample was chosen to maximize a specific experience
cross section to provide additional context to support and expound upon the policy
documents I used in the study. The small sample size was intentional because the pilot
perspective was not the most important aspect of this study but instead the policy process,
as described in the policy documents, was the fundamental component of this study.
Additionally, during negotiations with the RAAF Squadron commander, he agreed that 5
to 10 interviewees would be an acceptable number to interview without any negative
consequences.
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I contacted the participants through email and they were given a 10-question
open-ended interview sheet (Appendix C) to provide their perspective on the F-16 and F18 training policies. The questions were designed to take no more than 30 minutes to
complete. I did not discuss the questions or my personal opinions prior to administering
the questionnaire. The participants were allowed to keep their answer sheets, and findings
were validated through a follow up email to ensure an accurate interpretation of the
participants’ responses was reached while providing the participants the opportunity to
add, expound upon, and clarify any of their responses to the interview questions. It is
important to note that Question 10 was an optional free format section to allow the pilots
to expound upon any other fighter pilot training, culture, or policy issues they would like
to address. This type of data collection highlights the benefit of a qualitative case study
approach to gather additional information that may or may not be tied directly to the
research questions (Yin, 2011).
Instrumentation
Atlas.ti qualitative analytic software was used to collate and code the abstracted
data from the policy documents referenced in Appendix K. It was also used for the
development of additional visual graphics to further illustrate and present the findings
and analysis from the research process. The RAAF and USAF have standardized
publication, regulation, and instruction systems that are used to administer its programs.
Atlas.ti allowed for the collection and display of the resulting data that was used for
analysis and the results section of the study. For example, PFT, PET, learning theory, and
fighter pilot culture were used as coding categories for the data collection.
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The USAF and RAAF documents are the most reputable sources for the
comparison because they are the most stable, least likely to contain individual bias, and
clearly document the direction and methods used to administer the programs. How the
coded data was used to address the research questions and an explanation of why the
documents were sufficient to develop a comparative study is outlined in this chapter.
However, there are elements of fighter pilot culture that are not addressed within the
policy documents and a different data collection method was required to address this
topic.
The 10 question electronic interview Word document was used as a qualitative
data collection method to provide cultural context through a narrative format to better
understand the training programs and capture similarities and differences in each
program. A coding worksheet was used to consolidate themes extracted from the
participant response documents. Using only the policy documents or the interview results
alone would not provide the richness of data needed to address the research questions as
they apply to fighter pilot training policy. However, the integration of all data sources
provided sufficient information to conduct the analysis, formulate conclusions, generate
new questions, and open the door for future research.
Procedures For Recruitment and Participation
The first step in the data collection process was gaining permission from the
USAF and RAAF to use the previously introduced policy documents. I coordinated
research approval from the USAF Operations Group Commander (Appendix J) and Air
Education and Training Command (Appendix G) to use the policy documents. The USAF
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requires strict approval and control methods for non-sanctioned survey research,
involving USAF personnel. The control authority is located at the USAF Research
Oversight and Compliance Division in Washington, D.C.. Permission to conduct the
written interviews on the selected participants and the required documents are attached in
Appendix G. The RAAF required the same level of control to use policy documents and
to interview RAAF members. The RAAF F-18 Training Squadron Commander
(Appendix H), Air Combat Group Commander (Appendix K), and the Defence People
Research Low Risk Ethics Panel (Appendix L) each consented for me to use RAAF
policy documents and research RAAF pilots.
The procurement of the required policy documents required RAAF and USAF
unclassified network access. I used my personal system access to obtained the required
data; however, none of the documents will be released outside of the US and RAAF DoD
systems. The recruitment and follow up with the previously stated research participants
occurred over secured email.
Data Collection and Analysis Plan
In order to address how each research question was examined it is helpful to
review the central research question and each sub question.
The central research question is: What can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter
pilot training policy reveal about the best practices and optimal instructional approaches,
to inform policy development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot
training programs? I will begin the discussion by examining sub-question number one.
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1. How influential are current RAAF and USAF policy practices in shaping the
development of future policy?
Sub question number one was addressed primarily through examination of the
primary policy documents. A review of the stability of the current training programs from
a content, technological, methods, and budgetary perspective was undertaken. For
example, policy feedback theory is a central tenant in the study and I examined if prior
policy documents influenced current policy documents and at what pace the evolution in
training practices have occurred. For example, with development of improved simulator
capability, has the training evolved to take better advantage of these new kinesthetic
learning tools or have more traditional auditory and read write academic techniques
dominated the training structure? In addition to the well documented data in the policy
documents, question numbers one, two, six, eight, and ten on the interview sheet will
allow pilots to share their perspective on the stability of the program and the impact of
fighter pilot culture on its execution. Sub-question number one is oriented towards a
larger policy perspective in contrast to sub-question number two which is focused on the
course content and execution.
2. What training techniques are perceived to be most effective and efficient to
train new fighter pilots as fighter aircraft technology and training systems
advance?
Data collection for sub-question number two was composed of a coded
classification system based on the VARK model of learning. For example, syllabus
events that are primarily visually oriented such as power point presentations and graphs
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were coded as a visual event within each syllabus. Simulators were coded as kinesthetic
events. This coding was fairly simple and was entered and stored in Atlas.ti to facilitate
the program comparison.
Additionally, interview question number one, five, six, and nine addressed RAAF and
USAF training philosophy differences. For example, are the RAAF or USAF courses
designed to remove all students that cannot meet a strict standard on a specific time line
or is there the ability to tailor instruction to the individual needs of students? Also, the
comparison addressed differences in training timelines. Considering the content in each
course has grown with the addition of new technological capabilities the study addressed
how the USAF and RAAF have dealt with those changes. Comparing these issues
required an in-depth examination of the policy documents and an interpretation of the
responses to the interview questions.
3.

What impact will new technologies such as aircraft upgrades, simulator
capability, and new aircraft have in shaping future policy?

Research sub-question number three addressed projected aircraft, simulator, and
the F-35 program development. Due to the fact that this question addresses future
capability rather than established policy the data collection was focused on planning
documents and real-time data collected in the interview questions. Interview question
number five, six, and nine requested pilot input for how policy is developed and
administered.
Finally, the main research question was addressed through integration and
triangulation as described by Yin (2011) in the previously described collection and
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analysis section. The primary data collection methods that addressed research subquestions one through three provided the required data to address the following main
research question. What can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter pilot training policy
reveal about the best practices and optimal instructional approaches, to inform policy
development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training programs?
The study was designed to address the primary research question through the compilation
of data and information obtained while addressing the three sub questions. Therefore, the
data collection methods previously discussed were fundamental to addressing the primary
research question.
In summary, data collection and the document review focused primarily on
current policy documents. However, current policy documents highlight where changes
have been made to that document. out-of-date publications were reviewed in order to gain
a better understanding and context for major changes in the current document but out of
date publications were not the focus of the study. The interviews were emailed once
approvals were complete, and the participants filled out the data following review of the
instructions and completion of the consent form shown in Appendix B. Additionally, the
data was coded in Atlas.ti., which was used as the main data collection and analysis
system for the study. Chapter four and five discuss minor changes to the data collection.
Finally, it is highly likely that policy documents for this study will change prior to
publication of this document because the USAF publications are on a two-year update
cycle. This is an expected part of the policy process and I will not recollect data based on
periodic changes to the program.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
I triangulated from multiple policy documents in order to analyze each respective
policy process in order to ensure a credible and thorough comparison. Additionally, the
written interviews provided an element of validation in that other military pilots that have
experienced the respective training programs had the opportunity to explain their
understanding of the current policy process and the training programs. The perspective of
the additional pilots helped ensure any internal biases did not disproportionately skew the
interpretation of the data and reporting the results. The interviews were conducted in a
written format because this study is an international under taking. Face-to-face interviews
could have been used; however, written data provided the most standardized and
consistent information because of the more pronounced differences in verbal
communication styles between USAF and RAAF members compared with written
communication.
The most important measure of credibility in this study was in the evaluation of
the policy process and outcomes. The differences in Australian and U.S. culture and
language are less pronounced in written, as opposed to spoken, communication because
the western writing style is very standardized. For example, a verbal lesson from an
Australian fighter pilot is much more difficult to interpret considering all of the informal
communication styles of body language, inflection, and sarcasm that dominates the
Australian culture. However, the Australian written publications strip all of the nonverbal and most of the informal communication techniques that can confuse U.S.
members. What is left is a standard military communication style that is similar to
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American writing standards which allows for an easier comparison of the American and
Australian training programs. Additionally, the members were provided a summary of the
findings, interpretations, and recommendations in order to ensure an accurate
interpretation of their responses and intent to the interview questions.
The transferability of this study to an additional international fighter pilot training
comparative analysis should be easily achievable. This study lends itself to future studies
between USAF and Navy, Marine, Canadian, or other allied nation-training programs.
However, if one were to examine USAF training policy compared to Russian or Chinese
training then additional modifications may be required. This is not to rule out the utility
of comparing western training programs to other training programs but instead to
highlight the established precedent of cooperation and collaboration between many
western militaries (Hampton, 2014). Finally, the basic constructs of the qualitative multicase study used in this study should allow for similar modeling when comparing other
organizations. In fact, this study was modeled from previous single case and multi-case
studies developed by Maldonado (2015) and Allerdice (2011) that meet the scholarly case
study integrity defined by Yin (2011).
This study is designed as a stepping-stone to further DoD training policy research
and provides a simple method of scholarly comparison that is useful to scholar
practitioners. The study was developed to both develop new knowledge in the field of
policy research and to provide further insight for current policy makers who will continue
to redefine fighter pilot training policy in the future. The convenience sample used in this
study was strategically selected in order to maximize the breadth of experience of
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participants that will provide perspective to the policy document analysis. The study
ensures conformability to scholarly standards by using a qualitative method of inquiry
that allows for increased flexibility for future researchers to apply the selected research
methods to future policy phenomena.
Ethical Procedures
The data collection plans for this study meets all required permission standards
for data access, information sharing, and participant confidentiality and protection.
Permission to use USAF and RAAF policy documents have been coordinated and
approval documentation is provided in Appendices G, H, I, J, K and L. The primary
concern was ensuring that classified information was not released. I was aware that
combining multiple pieces of unclassified information can lead to revealing information
that the USAF and RAAF did not want released or at worst that disclosed classified
concepts. I was mindful of this concern and ensured only unclassified information was
used during data analysis and reporting.
I planned to interview 10 participants for this study and each signed a consent
form (Appendix B). The forms were distributed over military email systems, which
required password, or data encryption, which helped validate that the correct individuals
received and returned the required documents. All though their experience level was
documented, no other personally identifiable information was included in the study and
these protections ensure confidentiality for the participants. The interview consisted of
open-ended questions so there is no concern of participant manipulation and the questions
were designed in a format to merely seek the opinions of the participants.
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A final ethical concern was the fact that I am a USAF member who also flew in
the RAAF. I maintained professional relationships with all of the participants except for
Group C and these relationships may have impacted the individuals’ responses. However,
the document review data collection method helped to mitigate this concern and there
were no power differential concerns that impacted the study. Having served as a proud
guest in the RAAF I had the best interest of both the RAAF and USAF in mind and
conducted the study in order to meet the desires of each organization.
Summary
The purpose of this policy study was to compare and understand the differences
between USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policies. This chapter
explained the goals for the study and explained how the study was structured to address
the research questions. The procedures that have been put in place to ensure the validity
and trustworthiness of the study were also explained. The study was designed for the
scholar practitioner that is both attempting to acquire new knowledge and to identify
ways for policy makers to improve future policy. The study was important to facilitating
social change as the focus was on policy improvement in order to improve national
defense capabilities while minimizing the financial cost to U.S. citizens.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to compare and understand the
differences between USAF F-16 training and RAAF F-18 training in order to better
understand the policy process and provide new information to fighter pilot training policy
makers. The primary research question was: What can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
fighter pilot training policies reveal about the best practices and optimal instructional
approaches to improve policy development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF
fighter pilot training programs? I also addressed the following sub-questions to further
explore the primary research question.
Sub-questions:
1. How influential are current RAAF and USAF policy practices in shaping the
development of future policy?
2. What training techniques are perceived to be most effective and efficient to
train new fighter pilots as fighter aircraft technology and training systems
advance?
3. What impact will new technologies such as aircraft upgrades, simulator
capability, and new aircraft have in shaping future policy?
In this chapter, I review the study design and highlight minor changes from the
research plan presented in Chapter 3. Most importantly, I present the primary data
collected in the study. The primary data sources were archival USAF and RAAF syllabi
and 12 email interviews administered to USAF and RAAF fighter pilots. Additionally, I
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present my coding strategies and explain the setting, demographics, and data collection
and data analysis processes. I also explain the controls used to ensure trustworthiness of
the research and results and conclude with an explanation of how my study results relate
to the research questions.
Setting
The primary data sources for this study were the USAF F-16 training syllabus and
the RAAF F-18 training syllabus. The F-16 training process continued to evolve
throughout the duration of this project. For example, the F-16 syllabus is normally
updated in a 2-year cycle. As a result of a DoD identified fighter pilot shortage, there was
an initiative to shorten the course by consolidating several of the training events. The
amendment to the syllabus was called the Expedited Training Program (ETP). This
change highlights the evolutionary nature of the fighter pilot training programs. Despite
full access to USAF documents, it is important to note that my access to the Australian F18 syllabus was restricted because I am not a member of the RAAF and no longer have
access to policy changes. Additionally, I left Australia in 2016 having received
permission to use information from the current syllabus at the time, dated 2014.
Unfortunately, changes in duty assignments do not allow me access to any future RAAF
syllabus updates. However, I conducted the electronic interviews with RAAF pilots in the
spring of 2017, which helped highlight some of the minor Australian cultural and policy
changes in the last year. My primary aim in this project was to study the policy process
rather than to compare the syllabi content. Therefore, the fact that I did not have access to
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the most recent Australian changes had limited impact on the overall effort to answer the
research questions.
The secondary data sources were responses from 12 fighter pilots concerning
fighter pilot training policy and culture. The 10-question email interview (see Appendix
C) was designed to encourage fighter pilots to provide open-ended responses. A key
component of the data collection instrument was to encourage the fighter pilots to
provide their opinion concerning how best to develop future combat pilots. There is
potential that participant responses were influenced by my professional relationships with
them. Additionally, I have maintained personal relationships with two of the fighter pilots
beyond the professional duty assignment in Australia. Three of the interviews were from
anonymous USAF F-16 student pilots whose identity needed to be withheld because they
were still in the F-16 course. Although the role as a researcher may have had a limited
impact on the interview responses, it is also important to note that my ability to get
unbiased, honest, and direct responses from the fighter pilots was because of ongoing
relationships with them. The fighter pilot community has a unique culture, built upon
trust that is often exclusive.
Demographics
Syllabi
The primary data sources for this study were the USAF F-16 training syllabus and
the RAAF F-18 training syllabus. The Walden IRB, USAF, and RAAF required approval
documentation is attached in the respective Appendices at the end of this document. The
2014 RAAF and 2015 USAF syllabi were used for this study. The next releases are
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expected in 2017 and the data will not be updated with the publication of subsequent
syllabi updates. However, the USAF did release an exception to policy (ETP) addendum
to the F-16 syllabi in 2016. I thus reviewed this ETP in conjunction with the 2015
syllabus. However, RAAF approval to use their course information was limited to the
2014 syllabus. In the study, I was focused primarily on the policy development and
improvement process, and the 2014 syllabi coupled with the electronic interviews
provided the information needed to conduct the study.
Electronic Interviews
The demographics of the 12 interviewees were seven USAF and five RAAF
members. The members were emailed on their official military email accounts (except for
Group C explained below), which are on password protected (RAAF) or encrypted
systems (USAF). I chose the members from a convenience sample. There was an IRB
concern that I may have future influence on three of the pilot interviewees. As a result, I
developed and implemented an anonymous collection procedure, which I explain later in
this section (Group C). The data collection form was an email questionnaire (Appendix
C). The members emailed their responses, which I kept on a secure system. RAAF and
USAF pilots were selected based on specific experience levels and qualifications, which
added perspective and context to the archival data analysis.
Interviewee Selection Criteria and Process
The demographics of the 12 interviewees were as follows:
Group A: Two RAAF F-18 Pilots. These pilots were members of my F-18
introductory flight training class. They are in the RAAF and remain on a peer level. I will
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never have authority over them in the future since the exchange tour has ended. Although
anonymous students would have been ideal, I did not have access to new RAAF pilots
and would have strained the relationship with the RAAF to pursue them. Additionally,
these F-18 pilots completed training under the 2014 RAAF syllabus, which is the primary
RAAF source document for this study. Therefore, it was important to gain their
perspectives. Additionally, it was helpful that I knew the students on a professional level
and completed the training with them. Our common experience was helpful in
understanding each pilot’s perspective because of a shared lived experience and an ability
to remember the trials and successes each endured during the training.
Group B: 3 RAAF Instructor Pilots. The same considerations applied to this group
as those concerning Group A. These pilots were of the same approximate rank and
experience level. I will not have future influence on the selected pilots because the
professional exchange assignment has ended. The RAAF F-18 and F-35 instructor pilots’
perspective was important because they had significant influence shaping RAAF training
and the culture. Due to difficultly contacting several current RAAF F-18 instructor pilots,
I recruited current RAAF F-35 instructors who transitioned from the RAAF F-18 in the
past 18 months.
Group C: 3 USAF F-16 Pilots. This group caused the greatest concern because the
pilots were new F-16 pilots, which meant I could have influence over this group in the
future. It is unlikely that my supervisory duties will include members of this group, but it
is not impossible. Therefore, Group C needed more detailed collection procedures. The
protocol included contacting the student’s squadron commander who administered the
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anonymous survey to a class of 12 students. The commander and I do not know which
students participated in the study. The students anonymously submitted the documents,
and I deleted the documents from the common drive after the data was collected and
coded in Atlas.ti.
Group D: 3 USAF F-16 Instructor Pilots. These three pilots were peers at my
current F-16 base, and there were no concerns related to influence over these individuals
in the future. Of note, one of the F-16 instructor pilots recently transitioned to the F-35,
and adding this perspective was important to contrast with the RAAF F-35 instructor
pilots who previously flew the RAAF F-18 (Group B) that were added to the study.
Group E: 1 USAF F-15E Pilot that has served as a RAAF F-18 Pilot. This pilot
came from a pool of only two pilots. The pilot is a peer and flies another airframe, so I
should have limited interaction with him in the future. The pilot’s experience was
important because it provided an additional perspective of the RAAF F-18 training that is
different from the authors. My perspective is influenced by personal experience in the F16, and I judged that it was important to gain the perspective of a USAF pilot who flew in
the RAAF but had experience flying a different USAF airframe.
Group F: 1 RAAF F-18 Pilot who served as a USAF F-22 Exchange Officer. Due
to an inability to interview this pilot, this type of experience was supplemented with the
two additional RAAF F-35 instructor pilots previously discussed (Group B). Both of
these RAAF instructor pilots flew the F-18 in Australia in the past 18 months.
Collecting the comparative data from the syllabi and the interviews was
reasonably straightforward. The challenge was building the coding construct that would
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allow for a beneficial comparison of fighter training policy. In the next section, I explain
that process.
Data Collection
The USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 training syllabi as well as the responses to the
twelve fighter pilot interviews were loaded into Atlas.ti. The data collection required one
month to code and interpret the data within the syllabi. The interview processes took
three weeks to send the questionnaire, allow for interviewees to respond and return the
questionnaire and then to code the data in Atlas.ti. Additionally, the data from the syllabi
was imported into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to compare and contrast the training
requirements. Tables and charts were developed to visually illustrate the comparative
data. Specific data on numbers of events, flight hours, sortie numbers, and other
comparative details were analyzed. However, the comparison data will be shared as
visual bar graphs and percentages and will not include raw data due to security concerns
from the USAF and RAAF. This is a policy study and as such I focus on the policy
process and relative training composition rather than specific syllabi details and numbers
of training events. This also serves another purpose to ensure my research remains at an
unclassified level and does not blur any lines in the often-confusing classification of For
Official Use Only (FOUO) used in both the USAF and RAAF. However, the comparative
differences in the syllabi were helpful in better understanding and analyzing the fighter
training policy process. The only change to the collection plan in Chapter 3 was the
inability of the researcher to interview the RAAF F-22 exchange pilot. As discussed, an
additional USAF F-35 instructor who was previously an F-16 instructor and two RAAF
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F-35 instructors who previously flew the F-18 were added. There was a total of 12
interviews instead of the 10 interviews expected in Chapter 3.
Data Analysis
There were a total of eight codes used during data collection and analysis. The
primary codes were punctuated equilibrium theory, policy feedback theory, and fighter
pilot culture. An additional code of learning style theory was used for generic information
that related to learning style concepts. There were four sub-codes labeled learning style
theory auditory learning, learning style theory kinesthetic learning, learning style theory
written learning, and learning style theory visual learning. The added level of learning
style type specificity was needed to further define many of the concepts observed in the
primary documents and within the interview responses. Punctuated equilibrium and
policy feedback theory were further developed as the primary comparative themes and
the analysis of fighter pilot culture helped to provide context when classifying key policy
events into the PET and PFT categories. There were instances when each respective
learning style sub-code was used to show evidence of PET, PFT, and even to further
explain fighter pilot culture. There was an overlap of themes across the entire coding
process; however, PET and PFT remained the primary categories used to classify data.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The most consistent data in this chapter was taken from the respective syllabi.
These are published policy documents that are the most stable and are designed to
communicate the policy directly and succinctly. Therefore, the majority of data collection

72
for this study was focused on exact content of the policy documents. The problem with
this data collection scheme was that the Australian syllabus was written as a training
guide and was not as a complete policy document as is the USAF F-16 syllabi. The
RAAF may have similar policy documents; however, the researcher was not granted
access to further policy documents for this study. Therefore, additional interviews were
important to provide additional context, understanding, and perspective of the RAAF
syllabus events. The interview research was used to provide additional information on a
universal fighter pilot culture as well as the culture differences between the USAF and
RAAF fighter pilot organizations. The synthesis of these similar but also at times
conflicting data sources was needed for this study because it was important to accept a
holistic view while exploring this topic. Therefore, interviews were also needed to not
only understand the fighter training policy but also to understand the culture and norms of
the fighter pilot community. A better understanding of the fighter pilot culture helps to
explain how and why fighter pilots develop and implement training programs.
Transferability
Although this study was focused on USAF and RAAF fighter pilot training policy
it also established procedures to develop similar studies of other types of training policy.
Examining both the policy documents and cultural aspects of the respective organizations
provided a means to evaluate additional training programs. This study primarily explored
the policy process from a PFT and PET perspective. The same procedures could be used
to collect data and then analyze the data from other policy perspectives and training
theories. Some of which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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Dependability
The procedures to ensure dependability were not changed from Chapter 3.
However, it is important to highlight that an F-16 pilot collected and interpreted the data.
Although, there are risks to dependability based upon personal bias, personal experience
may have provided an opportunity to examine the two programs and then translate those
differences into a useful, comparative language. However, the process used for data
collection is repeatable and it would be fascinating to see the results if different
researchers with different professional experiences would reach different conclusions
from a similar fighter training policy comparison.
Confirmability
There were no changes to the confirmabilty strategy discussed in Chapter 3. As a
summary, the respective syllabi provided the most direct data for the study. The syllabi
are intended to directly communicate the training policy to the administrators of each
program and therefore meet the requirements of confirmability for this study as described
by Yin (2011). The fact that each of the members interviewed were current fighter pilots
also helped explore the cultural aspect and confirm where the syllabi continue to be
relevant and where segments of the fighter pilot population believe there needs to be a
change. The blending of two different data collection methods in this study was designed
to improve the confirmability and understanding of fighter pilot training policy by cross
checking the information from each respective source during the analysis and
interpretation of the information.
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Results
Findings of the Primary Research Question
The primary research question is what can USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter
pilot training policies reveal about the best practices and optimal instructional approaches
to improve policy development and efficacy of future USAF and RAAF fighter pilot
training programs?
The USAF and RAAF training programs are very similar with regards to
structure, flight hours, timeline, weight of effort, and instructional techniques. For
example, each course is currently six months long, consists of a conversion, air-to-air,
and air-to-ground phase. The conversion phase focuses on how to take off, land, aircraft
handling, and emergency procedures. The air-to-air phase begins with basic dog fighting
and progresses to larger 4 versus 8 air combat scenarios. The air to surface phase
includes sorties dedicated to precision and non precision air to ground weapons as well as
large force exercises that include combined air to air and air to surface training. The
sequence of academics, to simulator training, to flight training is also consistent across
each program. The end result of the training course is a wingman fighter pilot that will
receive additional training once he or she arrives at his or her operational unit.
During the coding process of the syllabi and the fighter pilot interviews it was
clear that the previous policy had a significant impact on future training policy and that
change was typically a slow and deliberate process. The overall training structure has
changed very little and policy feedbacks appeared to significantly limit drastic policy
changes within the two year syllabus revision cycle. However, events such as the current
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USAF fighter pilot shortage and maintenance issues accelerated USAF out of cycle
training and policy changes. For example, in 2015 an Exception To Policy addendum was
added to the USAF training program in order to shorten the course. Additionally, the
course was redesigned to still fully complete the training in a single seat aircraft. This
was because during the syllabus period the entire fleet of F-16 two-seat aircraft were
grounded due to maintenance problems. This was an example of a punctuated event that
forced a rapid change. Once the maintenance problem was fixed the USAF started using
the two-seat aircraft again but have retained the option to complete the single seat
syllabus if it is required again in the future. In fact, one F-16 instructor pilot commented
the USAF should transition to a “true C-Model (single seat) syllabus implemented in the
F-16. The requirement for D-model (two seat) rides adds unnecessary strain to the
scheduling/training process. We should teach single seat mentality from Day 1.”
The RAAF also seemed to follow a similar pattern of consistent policy. However,
the interviewees alluded to the fact that the shift to deployment operations and a similar
fighter pilot shortage in Australia has provided a catalyst for larger changes to the RAAF
F-18 training. Additionally, the transition to the F-35, which will replace the Classic F-18
over the next decade, is another example of significant event drastically changing the
training policy.
As an example, one F-18 pilot stated:
I believe the shift in philosophy towards a ‘mentoring/teaching culture’ has
improved all aspects of training and output.” Another pilot added, “I believe the
largest area of policy which needs to be addressed is the ‘how’ of the training
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system. Currently there is a one-size fits all approach to how things are taught and
how people learn. I believe this needs to change to a more flexible/individual
approach to teaching and learning.
A third F-18 pilot offered, “During the last five years I’ve seen a trend from
traditional fighter pilot training move toward performance enhancing coaching. I.e. a
move away from schooling in the form of pass/fail criteria towards ‘take as many goes as
you need’ attitude.” The RAAF transition to the F-35, which will replace the Classic F-18
over the next decade, is another example of a significant event drastically changing the
training policy. However, this study remained focused on the F-18 and F-16 policy only.
Differences. The USAF and RAAF differences are primarily a result of resource
availability and cultural differences. The most notable differences between the F-18 and
F-16 training program, from an administrative policy perspective, are the more highly
regulated control maintained by the USAF Air Education and Training Command which
is the higher headquarters command element for the USAF F-16 training program. In
contrast, the RAAF delegates most of the training decisions to the squadron level which
allows for a more flexible training program that can be adjusted within the 6 month
period of a class. The USAF in contrast requires a lengthy waiver process for syllabus
deviations and other administrative changes. Part of this is for good reason to standardize
training across multiple different F-16 initial training bases. However, it is evident in
reviewing the USAF and RAAF syllabus that the RAAF delegates the responsibility for
training decisions to a much lower level. The current USAF syllabus control authority is
a point of concern for F-16 instructor pilots. One instructor pilot stated the need to,
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“Decentralize syllabus execution! Allow flight and squadron commanders to tailor
syllabus to individual students (i.e. more rides when needed, or less when proficiency
dictates).” Additionally, the USAF goes into much greater detail concerning requirements
for failing a student, commander monitoring programs, and training documentation.
Many of the differences are a result of USAF and RAAF culture. The policy
documents did not highlight this difference; however, the interviews showed that the
RAAF pilots universally believed that previous RAAF training programs were designed
to maintain an extremely high standard and were willing to fail a larger percentages of
student pilots in order to quality control the pilots that graduated the program. As a result,
the pilots believed the training was focused on assessment, testing, and stress
management more than with the current USAF model that was more focused on
instruction, coaching, and student management to graduate a higher percentage of
students that started the course. Additionally, it was noted that the RAAF is a smaller
organization than the USAF and therefore, pilot reputation and potential for future
success was more closely scrutinized than in the USAF. The USAF seems to have placed
a higher priority on fighter pilot production over quality control of the students that
graduate. Or at least the USAF has made the decision to discriminate more thoroughly
amongst pilot ability during follow on training such as flight lead upgrade and instructor
training syllabus. The result is the RAAF produces a higher quality wingman at
graduation but at a higher relative cost considering the number of pilots that complete a
large portion of the training and then fail the course. It is important to note that the
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interview data indicates that the RAAF is currently changing it’s training policies;
however, I could not examine any recent changes since departing Australia in 2016.
Another difference that seemed to be based on both cultural and resource
availability was the RAAF higher use of dual aircraft with a back-seat instructor than the
USAF. Advantages to the dual option were that it required less total sorties per student to
complete the course because less direct support sorties were required. This was because
many sorties could be combined with two students as opposed to having a student in one
aircraft and an instructor in the other. Culturally, the RAAF preferred a more
concentrated and stress inducing program to not just test the student’s skill but also his
(to date there are no RAAF female fighter pilots) ability to mentally handle the future
stresses that fighter pilots are expected to endure. Having an instructor in the backseat
provides a safety measure to further push the students through more aggressive scenarios
and challenging situations with the benefit of a safety monitor in the back seat.
Disadvantages of the two-seat model are that the instructor cadre spends more
flights in the back seat, which requires two instructors for one student on many of the two
seat rides. It also delays the single seat fighter pilot mentality initially because there is a
more experienced pilot in the back seat for many of the student’s initial rides.
The simulator technology, and therefore the resulting training policy, also differs
between each of the programs. The USAF has a Unit Training Device (UTD), Weapons
System Trainer (WST) and Network Training Center (NTC) simulators. Each simulator
has its unique and different capabilities. The RAAF does not have the same simulator
capabilities. Although the types of events completed in the simulators are similar the
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USAF availability for students to use the simulator for kinesthetic learning practice is
more enhanced. The USAF syllabus is less compressed, as well, which provides students
more opportunity to practice procedures, weapons events, and emergency procedures in a
more detailed and representative environment.
Best Practices. The pilot’s interview responses show the importance of inducing
an adequate level of stress to bring each student to the optimum performance curve. It
appears that the RAAF program currently reaches a higher stress level as indicated by a
higher failure rate than the USAF. The students that do make it through the training have
shown not only a high level of flying performance but also pride and confidence at being
one of the few that could handle the demands of the program. The USAF attempts to do
its pilot screening earlier in the pilot training pipeline and as a result some of the high
stress techniques of the RAAF course such as information over load, higher demands for
rote memorization, more focused evaluation rather than instruction and time compression
are used less frequently in the USAF program. As a result, the USAF tends to have a less
uniform product following the training. For example, those that thrive in the less stressful
environment are free to perform at a higher level while some do not reach their full
potential because they were not pushed to find their limits.
Optimum Instructor Approaches. Interviews showed IP servant leadership was
the preferred and most effective leadership style. Additionally, students demanded very
high standards from IPs just as IPs held high standards for students. A USAF F-15E pilot
explained, “Probably the most important thing is a student-centered servant attitude of the
instructor. A commitment to helping the student learn vs. the adversarial ‘I’m going to
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make this hard because it’s supposed to be’ attitude.” The majority of pilots prefer the
written instruction followed by chair flying as a form of kinesthetic learning. However,
the lecture format in the USAF training is used much more extensively than in the RAAF
program. Older pilots preferred inflight correction as opposed to waiting until the
debriefing session to offer instructional techniques. However, younger pilots, closer to
the initial training, seemed to prefer post flight instruction. This is likely because younger
students are still in a completely overloaded state with the basic tasks of flying the
aircraft and inflight instruction compounds the overload. However, older pilots have
more ingrained habit patterns and experience with flight challenges and prefer the inflight
correction to instantaneously address issues rather than waiting until the debrief. There
was no consistent preferred learning style and most students required a comprehensive
learning strategy that played to various training techniques. Most respondents did not
think the simulator was sufficient to reduce flight training, as it did not replicate the
stresses of flight.
The USAF went into further depth during academic portions of the course. This
appeared to have both benefits and consequences. The RAAF program focuses on less
depth but ensures the academic material is delivered much closer to the phase of training.
USAF students provided feedback that academics are introduced too far in advance of the
actual flight training. The USAF as part of the PFT process does not allow enough time
to compress academics closer to the flying training. As a fighter pilot culture, the RAAF
is more oriented towards a phased based training approach, which is evident in both their
initial training and follow on operational training. The USAF tends to dilute its training
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by introducing many different subjects at the same time in an attempt to pre-load the
academic material so that that students are opted for more events in the training syllabus.
The primary reason being it is a much larger organization and struggles to manage the
larger number of students within the training window so the timeline between academics,
simulators, and flights tends to diverge throughout the course. Many F-16 students
explain that they have forgotten what they were exposed to in academics and have to
review the material again prior to the flight. One F-16 student pilot stated, “The perfect
balance would be academics within 2 days of the Sim where the knowledge is practiced
and that Sim within 2 days of the flight where both the knowledge and practice can be
applied.”
Findings of sub-questions:
How influential are current RAAF and USAF policy practices in shaping the
development of future policy? Previous policy influencing future policy was evident
throughout the policy documents and the perspective provided by the pilots. For example,
changes in mission requirements were often met with resistance. The two-year cycle for
USAF syllabus review did not appear to generate large changes unless there was a PET
event to inspire the change. For example, an F-16 structural problem for two-seat aircraft
and then a developing fighter pilot shortage forced the USAF to reduce rides and
compress the timeline to meet the demands. It also required a rewrite to the training
program mid-cycle.
Due to a lack of access to RAAF trend data across multiple syllabi changes it was
difficult to assess the PFT and PET concepts as derived from the USAF documents.
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However, the RAAF pilot interviews indicated that the RAAF policy tended to stagnate
at times but events such as recent combat deployments and the growth of the RAAF F-35
program has noticeably changed training priorities within the RAAF.
What training techniques are perceived to be most effective and efficient to
train new fighter pilots as fighter aircraft technology and training systems advance?
The USAF and RAAF conduct a phase-based training approach throughout the training
programs. This is a phased process of academics, introductory simulators, skill based
simulators, introductory flights and then demonstrating proficiency in the air. The pilot
interviews showed a preference for chair flying and visualization as most important for
superior performance in the air. The academic knowledge needs to be translated to
practical skills and the kinesthetic processes of “chair flying” led to better results in the
air. Visualization is important but realistic training devices are helpful in preparing
students to handle airborne challenges. However, there is majority agreement that the
simulator does not substitute for time in the air but supplements it as a means to prepare
for flight.
What impact will new technologies such as aircraft upgrades, simulator
capability, and new aircraft have in shaping future policy? The F-35 program is the
most current example of new technology shaping future policy. However, the pilot
interviews illustrate how there is policy carryover from previous fighter training
programs as different fighter pilot communities populate the new program. The F-35
community is currently trying to adapt policy developed within many different fighter
communities, which presents a challenge because each communities’ policies and culture
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are different. Meanwhile the F-35 technology is very different from legacy airframes,
which is creating different policy requirements that have not been addressed before.
Despite the policy and cultural differences, a recurring theme during the pilot
interviews was that the simulator capabilities across all airframes were helpful for skill
work and repetition of part task trainers, emergency and instrument training, and some
larger scenario development training. However, the simulator does not adequately
represent the stresses of flight. For example, the lack of G forces and other physiological
issues as well the lack of concern for personal well being while in the simulator were
important in understanding why pilots did not feel the simulator could reduce the need for
flight hours. From a policy perspective as the F-16 and F-18 age they will become more
and more expensive to operate and the F-35 already has a high operational cost.
Therefore, policy makers will continue to have to balance the need to supplement flying
training with simulator capabilities.
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Supporting Data
Coding Data
Table 1
USAF and RAAF Coding Summary

Table 1 shows all coding data collected from the study. The F-18 Conversion,
both F-18 Air-to-Air, and F-18 Air-to-Surface documents are all taken from the RAAF F18 syllabus. The data is combined in the chart below. The RAAF Syllabus is separated
because the RAAF only released specific sections for use in this study. This also explains
why there are no codes assigned for PET and PFT within the RAAF syllabus despite
there being a total of 5 PET and 69 PFT codes within the USAF Combined Wingman
Syllabus dated September 2015. It appeared that the punctuated events occurred at a rate
similar to the USAF. The higher rate of PET coding during the interview process is likely
due to the fact that the interviewees are asked specific questions concerning the change
they have seen and would like to see in future fighter pilot training policy. Therefore, it

85
seems reasonable that there would be a higher rate of PET discussions because they are
often generated by more drastic changes then are typically seen during a steady PFT
process.
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Figure 1. USAF and RAAF policy document coding summary.
Figure 1 graphically shows there are 161 auditory codes in the USAF syllabus
and only 94 in the RAAF syllabus which shows a 58% difference and highlights the
RAAF places less emphasis on the lecture and places more responsibility on the student
for self-study to maintain the pace of the program. It is important to note the volume of
information required for students to absorb is similar between each program. Both
programs place a much higher emphasis on the kinesthetic learning style and at
approximately the same rate of effort. This makes sense because the USAF and RAAF
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are conducting flying training courses which is mostly composed of training device,
simulator, and flight training which are all coded as kinesthetic events.
Another interesting theme is illustrated in Figure 1: the much higher rate of
auditory learning styles seen in the CWS and RAAF syllabus. The pilot preferred
learning styles were more uniform with a slightly higher preference for kinesthetic
learning practices over the others. It is important to note that during the coding process all
lectures in the respective syllabi were coded as auditory. Although in practice there is a
mix of auditory and visual learning as well as occasional kinesthetic and written
techniques used within certain lectures. However, it does appear, especially in the USAF
F-16 syllabus, that there is a large preference for lecture presentation instead of other
types of learning delivery methods. These concepts will be visited again when moving
from the subjective coding data and comparing with the objective syllabus data depicted
in coming sections.

Figure 2. Coding percentage differences within the USAF and RAAF syllabi.
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Figure 2 shows the coding percentage difference within each respective syllabus.
Additionally, the USAF syllabus is designed to synchronize all USAF F-16 training bases
across Air Education and Training Command whereas the RAAF only needs to
standardize one squadron. As a result, the USAF syllabus is much more policy oriented
and influenced by policy feedback, and goes into greater depth concerning administrative
procedures. Also, the RAAF is a smaller organization and has a more compressed course
timeline, which shows an increased focus on the kinesthetic elements of simulators and
flying and less effort on academic depth.
There was little coding of fighter pilot culture from the syllabus documents. This
seems logical because the intent of the syllabus is to objectively define the policy and
remove much of the subjective cultural aspects that are influential during the fighter pilot
interviews.
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Figure 3. USAF and RAAF interview coding.
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Figure 3 shows how influential fighter pilot culture is within the fighter pilot
community. Across the RAAF and USAF interview sample all pilots except for F-16
Pilot 1 and F-16 IP 2 and the USAF exchange pilot discussed fighter pilot culture and
more specifically the importance of fighter pilot culture more than any other topic. A
common theme was that the consistent, and at times oppressive, focus within both air
forces on political correctness was hurting the tactical capability of its pilots.
One pilot explained:
I feel there is too much emphasis put on promotion and secondary duties, which
have no real bearing on being a ‘fighter pilot.’ For example, I don’t really see
people being evaluated on how good they are in the jet but more on what Open
Day/ Dinner/ Meeting they helped plan. One student on B-course is currently also
enrolled in a master’s degree to help him for later promotion. To me he should be
using study time to further his tactical knowledge.
The challenges, dangers, and mindset needed to fly single seat fighter aircraft
requires pilots that are not risk averse and brutally honest with each other during training.
In addition to the auditory, visual, written, and kinesthetic codes, general learning style
code was included to capture the instances when pilots specifically acknowledged the
importance of understanding and fusing different types of learning techniques but did not
specify which one.
The RAAF pilots consistently acknowledged a transition within the RAAF from a
training policy that focused in part on evaluating and testing pilots and pushing pilots to
their maximum capability. If that maximum capability did not meet the minimum
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standard then there were no concerns with failing the student from the course. As the
demands for fighter pilots in the RAAF has increased there is a concern that in an attempt
to change the course to more of a coaching and instructing focus, coupled with a
willingness to provide additional resources to prevent a student from failing from the
course, will ultimately produce less capable pilots.
The USAF pilots seemed to acknowledge that the USAF had made the transition
to more of an instruction course and has developed a much more stringent Commander
Awareness Program (CAP) to monitor and develop the students that were struggling. The
results were a smaller percentage of students failed from the USAF course. The goal
being that the pilot screening had already occurred during earlier phases of the pilot
training pipeline and that the students that had been accepted into the F-16 community
had already passed the screening bar. Failing an F-16 student would be a large waste of
resources considering the time and money already invested to get he or she into the
course.
Another theme from the interview coding process showed that pilots preferred a
variety of methods of auditory, visual, and written learning styles. However, there was a
trend that kinesthetic styles were the most important. That ranged from “chair flying” or
sitting on the ground and visualizing or rehearsing practice tasks that they would be
required to perform in the air as critical to success. However, there was also a theme that
simulator training was in no means adequate to reduce flight time even in aircraft as
advanced as the F-35, let alone the F-16 or F-18. Pilots acknowledged the importance of
simulators as essentially an advanced form of practice and visualization that can be
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applied in the air. However, none of the kinesthetic techniques used on the ground could
replicate the stress in flight. Much of that stress comes from gravitational forces, sounds,
smells, and inability to replicate the numerous technological, weather, air traffic control,
physiological variables that routinely go wrong while in flight. With the understanding
that the ground portion for kinesthetic training cannot replicate flight it was consistently
identified as an extremely worthwhile tool in preparing for flight. Flying is focused
primarily on a practical application of an endless supply of required academic
information. The simulator helps increase the retention of academic concepts through
applying kinesthetic techniques to reinforce the skills and concepts introduced in the
classroom. Although a simulator cannot replicate flight it can teach pilots many valuable
lessons that can then be applied or avoided inflight.
Policy Comparison Data
The following section presents the comparative differences between the USAF
and RAAF training syllabi. Due to the fact this is an unclassified study and the
documents used in this study are For Official Use Only (FOUO) the numerical values are
removed from the charts in order to remain with the spirit of the agreement with the
RAAF and USAF concerning releasing syllabi data to the public. However, the trend data
shows the differences in focus within each program, which is the most important aspect
of the policy review.
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Figure 4. USAF and RAAF ground training. Numbers hidden for security.
Figure 4 shows the differences in weight of effort as defined by the number of
syllabus events for each category of ground training events. For example, lectures are
more prevalent in the USAF than the RAAF program. However, the RAAF uses an
electronic workbook for the individual to replace much of the classroom time. The RAAF
program remains more grounded in the practical portions of flying whereas the USAF
tended to dive deeper into theoretical and back ground topics in the hope of giving a
greater overall perspective. The consequence of the increased depth is additional time in
training for the student, which is not an option in the RAAF because they must remain on
the six-month course timeline.
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Figure 5. USAF and RAAF ground training by phase. Numbers hidden for security.
Figure 5 highlights the differences in weight of effort as defined by number of
events of ground training by each phase. TR is the transition phase, AA is the air-to-air
phase, and AS is the air to surface phase. The reader can see the more in-depth focus on
systems and overview information in the USAF TR phase. However, the weight of effort
between the two programs is very similar throughout the course.
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Figure 6. USAF and RAAF simulator training by phase. Numbers hidden for security.
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Figure 6 highlights the resource differences between the USAF and RAAF.
Within the simulator devices the USAF has many device resources they leverage across
the course. The logic is that it is cheaper to put the student through multiple ground-based
simulations to learn the basics that can then be reinforced in the air when the cost per
hour exponentially increases. The transition phase focuses on takeoff, landing,
instruments, emergency procedures and aircraft handling.

F-16 Device Training
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(NTC)
(CI)
(EPT)

Figure 7. USAF F-16 device training (numbers hidden for security)
Figure 7 shows the composition of different training devices and simulators used
in the USAF. Each device is different from simple emergency procedures trainers (EPT)
all the way to a Network Training Center (NTC), which includes full aircraft replication
with 360 high-resolution visual graphics. In contrast, the RAAF F-18 program only has
one type of simulator, which limits the types of events that can be practiced/replicated in
the simulator. Much of the simulator work is front loaded in the course and is focused on
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emergencies and instrument training. This explains why the USAF places a higher
emphasis on simulator training in the beginning of the course.
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Figure 8. USAF and RAAF sortie allocation by phase (numbers hidden for security)
Figure 8 shows several important trends to consider when examining policy
differences between the programs. First, the F-18 student’s complete 12% more flights
than the F-16 students. However, when combining the total number of sorties required to
train a new pilot the USAF uses 8% more rides than the RAAF. This is because the
RAAF completes more dual flights than the USAF and more dual flights in which there is
a student and instructor in the front of one aircraft flying with another student and
instructor in a separate aircraft. Meanwhile many of the USAF sorties that have solo
students require more direct support aircraft to complete the same number of training
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rides for the students. This allows the RAAF students to complete more student sorties at
a reduced total number of sorties compared to the USAF. However, more dual sorties
also mean that more instructors must be available because on most dual sorties there is an
instructor in the dual aircraft and also in the direct support sorties that are needed to
accomplish the training tasks.
Summary
Summary of Findings of the Primary Research Question
The USAF and RAAF training programs are each six-month programs with a
similar composition and delivery style. The policy feedback process appeared to be
influential in explaining why and how the policy documents evolved over time. However,
the information derived from the coding construct showed that punctuated events also
influenced the training policy process. For example, the USAF experienced unplanned
maintenance and pilot shortages inside the normal planning timeline that generated
significant change. The USAF showed only a 7% coding rate of PET within the policy
document. However, the time period examined in this study as well as the responses to
the fighter pilot interviews highlighted examples of punctuated events greatly influencing
the policy process.
The primary differences between the USAF and RAAF programs were the result
of contrasting resource availabilities and cultural differences. The fact that the USAF is
trying to maintain standardization across a much larger bureaucratic organization
revealed that although the USAF has access to greater resources that there are training
efficiencies that could be better leveraged that will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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The cultural differences between the USAF and RAAF were most evident when
comparing the responses to the interview questions. The most noticeable differences in
policy outcomes were how each air force viewed initial fighter pilot training as either an
instructional course or as an evaluation of student potential for future training challenges.
However, this discussion cannot be used to stereotype the USAF and RAAF on different
sides of this issue. There is disagreement across the entire community of how best to
design training policy and the USAF and RAAF have recently become more aligned with
the introduction of Joint F-35 because the USAF and RAAF are training in the same
squadron. It will be interesting to see which direction each Air Force follows in the future
and there was not enough data available in this study to predict how the F-35 program
will evolve. Although the USAF F-16 will be in service until 2048 the RAAF Classic F18 community will likely see an even greater pace of change since the RAAF is retiring
the Classic F-18 and intends to transition to the F-35. The F-35 has more advanced
technologies and is a single seat only aircraft. Losing the two-seat training capability will
likely have future training ramifications that will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Another finding was a better understanding of the fighter pilot’s perspective on
the importance of simulator technology. It did not appear that the USAF improved
simulator capabilities significantly improved quality of product at the end of the program
because the RAAF found other ways to compensate in their program. Once example was
the RAAF flew 12% more flying sorties than the USAF.
Best practices identified throughout the training included well-designed stress
application to the students coupled with servant instructors, and a timely introduction of
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academic, simulator, and flight training. Much of the discussion in Chapter 5 will discuss
recommendations for the USAF to continue to evolve to find an optimum balance of
stress management, instructor involvement, and timely introduction of training events in
the best sequence to maximize student learning and performance.
Summary of Findings of sub-questions
Both previous policy and unexpected punctuated environmental changes
influenced policy outcomes throughout the policy documents and the perspective
provided by the pilots. The phased based building block training plans followed a
consistent process of academic, simulator, and flight training within the TR, AA, and AS
phase. This training plan used in the USAF and RAAF appeared to be effective in
developing new fighter pilots. Further discussion in Chapter 5 will offer different types of
training styles future policy makers may want to consider. However, there was no
information that indicated the current Western training style was not effective.
In addition to the training and policy development process the technological
evolution of aircraft and simulator technology does impact future training. There was a
consistent theme from pilots concerning a need to protect flying training resources
because simulator training does not adequately substitute for the real thing. However,
there does appear to be data that shows that improving kinesthetic training tools does help
pilots perform better in the air. Further discussion in Chapter 5 is needed to explore
additional ideas to supplement flight training because the number of flight hours available
to pilots in the future will likely remain a limited resource.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented the research findings as they related to the research
questions. Chapter 5 will further develop the interpretation of those findings and explain
the significant limitations placed on this study. Additionally, I will provide several fighter
training policy recommendations for USAF policy authors to consider when developing
future training programs. The goal is to not only provide information to improve future
training programs but also highlight the importance of remaining a good steward of
public resources when developing future training policies.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
In this qualitative multi-case study, I compared USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
fighter training policies to better understand the training policy process. A major goal was
to provide U.S. policy makers new insights to capitalize on best practices, which could
result in more efficient use of resources to train new fighter pilots. The USAF and RAAF
are currently involved in the transition from fourth generation fighters such as the F-16
and F-18 to the fifth generation F-35 JSF. However, the USAF and RAAF intend to
integrate fourth generation aircraft with the JSF for decades to come (Clashman, 2017).
The U.S. partnership with Australia will continue as the United States and many of its
allies transition to the JSF (USAF, 2015). In this chapter, I summarize and explain the
key findings from the study, discuss policy recommendations and recommendations for
future research, and reiterate the study’s importance for social change.
Interpretation of the Findings
Program Similarity
The USAF and RAAF training programs are each approximately 6-month
programs with a similar composition and delivery style. Each course follows a similar
structure, which includes academics, simulators, and flights in a linear sequence of
transition, air-to-air, and air-to-surface phases.
Program Differences
The cultural differences and the resource disparity between the USAF and the
RAAF were the most striking differences. The USAF’s perceived challenge was how to
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best manage a training syllabus that develops a standardized product across many
different squadrons. The USAF’s advantage was the fact that there was a large
organization and more academic, simulator, and training airspace resources at the policy
maker’s disposal to develop new training policy. However, in an attempt to standardize
the training process, the individual squadrons lacked the ability to tailor training to meet
student’s individual needs in comparison to the RAAF program. The RAAF training
course comprised one squadron and a smaller cadre of IPs, which allowed the RAAF to
make internal changes quickly without needing to gain approval from higher
headquarters. Many of the USAF and RAAF differences may be a result of the relative
scales of the USAF and RAAF. There also appears to be many cultural differences that
influenced training policy.
Culture
The most noticeable cultural difference between the USAF and RAAF programs
was a difference in instructor pilots’ instructing styles. The USAF program was
developed as an instructional course with most of the pilot aptitude screening occurring
in early stages of training. The Australians appeared to have designed their course not
only as a means to develop new fighter pilots but also to screen pilots who did not have
the necessary skills and attitude to succeed as an Australian fighter pilot. Therefore, the
RAAF was willing to collectively push students to a higher stress level as a means to test
them. As a result, a higher percentage of students failed the course, which was viewed as
an acceptable consequence to ensure the very high standards of the students who did
complete the course. Several of the highly experienced and most influential RAAF

101
instructor pilots expressed that they felt the end result of a more intense training program
was a more highly qualified and proficient wingman.
Another aspect of the RAAF culture that seemed real but difficult to explore
during the data collection was something the Australian’s referred to as the “tall poppy
syndrome.” This meant that the RAAF pilots were very sensitive to any pilots who
seemed to be rising too far above the rest of the crowd, and collectively the RAAF pilots
would “cut down” a pilot who tried to show up or rise too far above his peers. Although
this phenomenon is common throughout fighter squadrons, it seems USAF fighter
squadrons tend to more openly celebrate individual achievements than do RAAF
squadrons. This observation says nothing to the competitive nature, work ethic, or
standard of excellence that exemplifies the RAAF fighter squadrons, but does highlight
that although outstanding performance is expected, it should not be done too loudly or to
one-up peers in the squadron.
The differing philosophy may be partly attributed to the fact that the F-16
community is much larger than the RAAF F-18 community. As a result, there is larger
variation in pilot proficiency within the community. This is important because in an
attempt to standardize the training, much of the ability of the USAF squadrons to tailor
training was limited because of the bureaucratic nature of the syllabus and many of the
administrative requirements. The RAAF program, in contrast, is carried out in one
squadron, and all of the pilots know each other. This allows for more personalized
decision-making when evaluating the potential of individual students.
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As a result of this difference in culture, there was an additional, noticeable
difference between the two training programs. My syllabi review showed that the RAAF
students completed 2.5 times as many dual sorties as the USAF students. The RAAF and
USAF have approximately the same percentage of two seat aircraft in training squadrons;
however, the RAAF elected to fly more of the sorties with a student in the front and an
instructor in the back seat than did the USAF. RAAF culture seemed to be the most likely
reason for the difference. First, the RAAF faced more significant fiscal, resource, and
time constraints to complete the training in a defined six-month period. With only one
squadron teaching the RAAF Classic F-18 training at a time, any delay in the program
would significantly ripple through the remaining squadrons. Therefore, more events were
compressed into a student’s schedule in a day, and a student needed to prepare a larger
volume of material for the following day’s events to stay ahead of the curve. This
heightened paced added considerable stress to the students and, coupled with demanding
training scenarios, often pushed many of the students beyond their current limits. The
problem with pushing pilots beyond their limits is that results can often be unsafe. The
two-seat aircraft provided a safety monitor/instructor to help correct errors and prevent
dangerous situations from developing.
In contrast, the USAF tended to reduce the intensity of many of the training
events to allow the students to fly solo. The students are not exposed to some of the more
demanding situations as the RAAF pilots as early in the training; however, there is a
benefit of increasing the student’s solo time because it is critical to developing a single
seat fighter pilot.

103
Collectively, the fighter pilot community has wrestled with the need for fighter
pilot production balanced with the need for quality control of the product produced. In
the midst of the continuous war on terror since 2001, it appears there is a similar
transition to a less proficient force in the USAF for many different reasons. Some
examples cited by pilots in this study included leadership failing to make tactical flying
excellence a priority, a risk adverse politically correct culture, a lack of training
resources, burn out, and an improving airline industry that is luring the most experienced
pilots from the USAF. Meanwhile, the USAF has renewed its commitment to maintain a
certain number of fighter pilots, but the rate at which the USAF is trying to accomplish
this goal risks sacrificing quality in order to meet quantity numbers. A second order
effect is even if the USAF can produce more pilots, it does not necessarily mean it can
absorb all of those pilots effectively in front line units. As a result, the pilot production
problem leaves policy makers with a difficult decision to reduce training standards in
order to ensure the required level of production.
There is disagreement across the entire community of how best to design training
policy; however, it does appear that there are few short cuts when it comes to developing
new and proficient fighter pilots. There are opportunities to improve technological
training capabilities; however, as noted by the pilots I interviewed, there are few
substitutes for actual flying time. Flight time is critical for placing new pilots in
demanding situations to develop the skills and air sense needed to succeed as a fighter
pilot.
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The RAAF will lose the two-seat capability as it retires its Classic F-18 fleet and
transitions to the JSF. It remains to be seen if the RAAF will elect to reduce training
standards in order to accommodate a training program that remains safe for solo study
pilots. Or if the RAAF will increase its screening demands to ensure that students
selected for the program have proven to have the capacity to fly single seat fighters in
highly demanding situations before ever being selected to fly the F-35.
The USAF F-16 policy makers face a different challenge in that the F-16 program
is expected to continue until 2048 (Clashman, 2017), which will necessitate redefining
the F-16s role in 21st century warfare as a compliment to the more capable fifth
generation aircraft. Policy makers will need to make similar decisions whether to increase
pilot standards, leverage two seat capabilities, or transition away from two seat options
and use the simulator to introduce more of the most challenging scenarios. The USAF
and RAAF have recently become more aligned with the introduction of the F-35 because
the USAF and RAAF are training in the same squadron. It will be interesting to see
which path each air force follows. There was not enough data available in this study to
predict how the F-35 program will evolve in the future.
Technology
The USAF and RAAF pilots believed that simulator training did not adequately
replace actual fight training. However, both the USAF and RAAF relied heavily on the
use of simulators throughout the training program. In 2015, it cost approximately $20,000
per flight hour to fly the F-16, which is more expensive than both high- and low-end
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training simulators. Therefore, it will remain important for the USAF to use the
simulators for both cost effectiveness and as a safe way to introduce pilots to new tasks.
During the interview coding process, it also became evident that students relied
heavily on kinesthetic techniques to prepare for flight tasks. The simulators seem to offer
the best option for flight prep because it allows students to go through a hands-on process
to develop habit patterns and procedures through repetition and trial and error that would
not be possible in the actual aircraft. Therefore, in addition to improving the actual flight
simulators, policy makers should consider providing additional resources for more
computer-based, low-cost simulators to use in the classroom and for self-study as a
means to improve opportunities to help students prepare for the actual sorties. The
traditional “chair flying” method included envisioning flight events and reviewing
sequences as pilots expect them to occur in the air. The problem with this visualization is
that a new pilot has not learned the pacing, sight pictures, and control application
required to accomplish many required tasks. Therefore, continuing to develop and
implement lower cost simulations to help students with accurate visualization and
preparation could significantly help students prepare for flight training.
Another important component for improved simulator use is the fact that the
simulator can be used to simulate scenarios that are not safe or that cannot be
accomplished in the normal training environment. Fully developed emergency
procedures, weapons employment, and threat simulation are often not available in the
flight-training environment; however, the simulator provides an opportunity to test many
of the more advanced concepts that are not available in a real environment. The important
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theme associated with improved simulator training is to use it to supplement, but not
replace flight training.
Evidence of PET and PET
The USAF and RAAF training programs are each six-month programs with a
similar composition and delivery style. The policy feedback process appeared to be
extremely influential in explaining why and how the policy documents evolved over
time. When reviewing the pilot interview responses it was clear that many of the training
events and techniques used during the training process were the result of previously
proven effective techniques that pilots continue to use and refine today. The balance of
academic, simulator, and flight training appeared to be consistent as a proven formula to
develop a new fighter pilot within the six to nine month window. The governance stream
of PFT appeared to play the most significant role in shaping syllabi revisions. The
procedures in the previous syllabus were the starting point for the next syllabus and
although the tactical training events often changed in the new syllabus, the program
policies for how to execute the program changed very little. However, in the USAF F-16
program the exception to policy (EPT) training syllabus illustrated a punctuated event
and a departure from the PFT theme. The USAF experienced a fighter pilot shortage
crisis as more and more experienced fighter pilots left the service due to a combination of
reasons such as new economic opportunities and burn out from the pace of the USAF
lifestyle. As a result, there was a decision to shorten the length of the training program to
include academic and flight hours to an unprecedented level within the F-16 program
considering the volume of information required for today’s fighter pilot. In parallel the
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RAAF has also experienced significant changes as they joined the fight against ISIS in
the Middle East in 2015 and are also enjoying a booming airline industry that is further
taxing the available pool of experienced fighter pilots.
Although there did appear to be evidence of both PFT and PET events within the
policy process it is important to note that these two processes do not explain all events
within the policy process. The following section is used to introduce several additional
policy theories to include ambiguity and multiple streams, advocacy framework, and
narrative policy theory. There may be potential for future policy researchers to study
fighter-training policy through a different theoretical construct.
Ambiguity and multiple streams. Ambiguity and multiple streams theory
(AMS) is used to explain how an entire organization works in an ambiguous environment
with multiple stakeholders, agendas, and variables that contribute to the policy process
(Zahariadis, 2014). The theory is well documented and has the benefit of being a holistic
approach to understanding the U.S. government policy process. However, the goal of the
fighter pilot training comparison was to use a conceptual lens that allowed for the policy
process to be broken down into comprehendible parts in order to make a valid
comparison. The AMS approach could be a viable option for future research into USAF
fighter pilot training policy; however, the author believed it was too complex for the
scope of this study.
Advocacy framework theory (AFT). Advocacy framework theory proponents
seek to use the policy system as the main unit of analysis to understand the policy process
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014). For example, a policy topic such
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as training policy and the stakeholders that directly or indirectly impact how the policy
develops are used as the basic level of analysis. The stakeholders are then organized into
coalitions based on particular shared beliefs, desire, or motivation that interact with other
competing and complementary coalitions. The resulting policies are the result of the
translated beliefs between the individual coalitions (Smith et al., 2014). At a very basic
level the interaction of pilots, engineers, command sections, contracting, and airfield
support agencies will all fall into particular coalitions that shape the resulting training
policy. However, the coalitions that would naturally develop in the USAF system would
likely differ from the coalitions in the RAAF structure and would have created a
confusing metric to conduct the comparison. This framework would likely work better in
a case study of an individual training program.
Narrative policy framework (NPF). The narrative policy framework is
interesting as it allows the researcher to explain how a policy maker’s message impacts
policy as much as the underlying dynamics that inform the policy. The NPF is a new
policy framework and has the potential for new studies into the policy process (McBeth,
Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). For example, the Chief of Staff of the USAF has recently
highlighted the importance of the F-35 program to not only the DoD but to our many
partner nations that have committed to purchasing the new aircraft (Maldonado, 2015).
Despite the continuous problems that plague the F-35 program as documented by
Maldonado (2015), it would be interesting to explore how the policy narratives from
congressional and USAF leadership are impacting the resulting policy. However, the
NPF does not provide the needed structure to compare the F-16 and F-18 training policies
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in this study. NPF certainly has potential for future research to see how the leadership
narrative impacts the evolution of new training policies.
Optimum Instructor Approaches
Servant leadership. Another major finding of the study was the importance of
support to the student to maximize success. Although students must accept significant
personal responsibility for their own training each of the pilots that responded to the
interviews highlighted the importance of instructor skill to facilitate the student’s
learning. Servant leadership is a term used to describe leaders that put the needs of
followers first above their own (Marquet, 2013). There appears to be a correlation with
the importance of a similar mindset for instructor pilots as instructor pilots serve as both
teachers and leaders for new pilots. The pilots believed that instructors that tailored
instruction to the needs of the students were most effective in helping pilot’s master new
flying tasks. There may be parallels to this servant leadership concept that would help
instructors learn to tailor instruction to a student’s most effective learning style. This
additional instructional flexibility would lead to policy changes to de-standardize portions
of the training program to better meet the instructional needs of individual students.
Although this concept may sound intuitive many of the policy decisions within the USAF
syllabus actually inhibit this process because the syllabus and special instructions to
accompany the syllabus are often overly prescriptive and limit the instructor’s ability to
tailor training to best meet the students’ needs. There is good reason for this as the
syllabus is designed to standardize training. However, a compromise may be needed. A
potential solution would be to delegate the waiver authority for deviations to the syllabus
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to the squadron commander, which is very similar to the RAAF process. The USAF
waiver authority is currently held at the higher headquarters level, which makes adjusting
training more difficult and administratively demanding. The added red tape often
prevents an instructor from going through the effort to make adjustments for student’s
training.
Recognizing the strong desire for kinesthetic preparation. Another recurring
theme was a strong desire from pilots to use kinesthetic preparation techniques to prepare
for syllabus events. Computer based software to simulate avionics use in the airplane as
well as to access individual flight trainers such as the UTD could significantly help
students mentally prepare, visualize, and rehearse for approaching flights. Even if the
preparation is not a perfect replication of the true challenges of the actual flight; using
computer based aids to rehearse basic procedures can be valuable in helping a student
understand the task load, cadence, and challenges of basic procedures in flight. This prior
preparation can help students get better training from their time in the air because they
are better prepared for procedural aspects of flight and can spend more cognitive effort in
the air to learn the skills and judgment decisions that must occur during flight.
Best Practices
Best practices identified throughout the training included well-designed stress
application upon students coupled with a timely introduction of academic, simulator, and
flight training. Phase-based training still appears to be the most effective training
technique for fighter pilot training; however, it is important to note it is not the only
technique. The USAF should continue to evolve to find an optimum balance of stress
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management, instructor involvement, and timely introduction of training events in the
best sequence to maximize student learning and performance.
Stress management. The application of stress is a critical component of the
fighter pilot training because pilots have to perform during life and death situations on a
regular basis. Many flight tasks can be learned over time; however, the six-month
training courses demand a steep learning curve in order to accomplish all of the training
tasks in the allotted time frame. Students must adapt to new challenges and demands
throughout the training program and if a student falls behind there often is not time for
the student to recover. It is not enough to just learn the information or to accomplish the
flight maneuvers. The training needs to ensure the students are forced to think and
respond under pressure to prepare them for challenges of combat flying. Finding the
correct balance is important as applying too much stress leads to a point of diminishing
returns in which performance suffers. The RAAF compresses its training schedule to both
finish the training quickly but also induces a significant level of stress simply through
forcing time management challenges to complete the task load. There could be benefit
from reducing the time in-between flights and actually reducing the number of hours of
academic training but placing it closer to the flight training. This adjustment would force
a sense of urgency and stress to demand the student’s full concentration and focus to
prepare for flights that are rapidly approaching.
Academic course timing. The F-16 student pilots believed better aligning
academic material with the corresponding simulator and flight training could be very
beneficial in improving their preparation for approaching flights. A major consequence of
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an increased training pace is that if a student falls behind in the training it is difficult to
catch up and the stress level can easily mount to a place where the student cannot
effectively recover. The USAF might need to accept a higher failure rate to actually
increase production by reducing the course timeline. This concept is applied in the RAAF
and also at the USAF Weapons School. Currently the USAF introductory F-16 training
has a much larger class size coupled with constraints on available flight hours. As a
result, the new USAF F-16 pilots have more time between flights as well as more time
from academic and simulator introduction until accomplishing the new event airborne.
Phase-based approach. The USAF and RAAF both follow a phased based
building block training plan following a consistent process of academic, simulator, and
flight training within the TR, AA, and AS phase. Although this training game plan has
proven effective it is not the only type of training available. For instance, the Dutch have
experimented with focusing on more mission-oriented training in their F-16 training
program. This is a move towards mission-oriented training that is more dynamic and less
structured than traditional training schemes (Van Der Pal et al., 2009). The intent is to
work from a primary goal backwards with the intent to meet a certain mission objective.
Instead of using incremental building blocks to arrive at the goal the training program
uses realistic scenarios to expose new pilots to very complex scenarios. This forces new
fighter pilots to learn many of the required fighter pilot skills in a more realistic
environment. For example, the USAF expends nine student basic fighter maneuvering
rides using canned fight parameters and set ups to show different sight pictures and teach
the students how to execute in those situations. As a result, over time the students are
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expected to learn how to apply the lessons they learned in those building block rides to
more dynamic air-to-air combat scenarios. However, another option would be to start
with more varied and diverse training scenarios that are designed to reach a missionized
outcome and then have students learn many of the same lessons within the scenario. This
difference is not used to create confusion or add to the complexity for fighter pilot
training policy authors but instead to highlight that many of the basic tenants of fighter
pilot training policy should not be taken for granted. There is utility to questioning all
assumptions in current training policy in order to find ways to improve future training
policy.
Limitations of the Study
The biggest limitation for the study was information access across many different
organizations and stakeholders. The USAF and RAAF operate with unique security
regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Many of these security restrictions
are different between each respective air force and are not conducive for a comparative
study. The most time consuming portion of this study included trying to negotiate the
approval and security concerns of all stakeholders. Although I believe the information in
this study is of value to future policy makers, and also provides a positive social benefit,
it is important to note that study does not address some of the most controversial issues
within the fighter pilot training community because it would likely prevent this study
from being published.
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Security
Much of fighter pilot training is classified and not releasable to the public. As a
result, I was only approved to explore specific aspects of the training policy and could not
address many important topics concerning fighter pilot training. In general, procedures
for handling classified information are well established. The challenge with this study
was that documents themselves are classified as a complete document as official use only
which is why I can not release my research records to the public and that I have published
no sections of the syllabus. However, I was diligent to ensure I only included unclassified
information in this study. In certain sections of Chapter 4 and 5 I was intentionally vague
with some of the results to ensure I took the safest approach and ensured there was no
question that all information in this study is unclassified.
Information Access and Approvals
This study required Walden University, USAF, and RAAF approval. Each
organization has differing research procedures and requirements. I took great care to meet
all of the requirements of all the organizations. As a result, there are missing segments of
policy documents that I was not allowed to use and also limitations placed on which
pilots I interviewed and how I conducted the interviews. However, having the
opportunities to experience both systems first hand I feel I was able to effectively bridge
the gaps of missing information while remaining within the requirements of all of the
organizations involved in this project.
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Distance
This project covered a four-year span and required coordination around the globe.
USAF coordination was required in Arizona, Alabama, Washington D.C., and Hawaii.
Coordination with the RAAF was conducted in New South Wales and the Australian
Capital Territory. During the first two years of the study the researcher lived in Australia
and had many difficulties communicating with individuals in the United States. Having
moved back to the United States, I continue to have challenges contacting members in
Australia.
Recommendations
Higher Classification Study
This study focused specifically on policy implications of the USAF and RAAF
training programs. I believe a more in-depth classified study sponsored by the USAF and
RAAF would be beneficial. The goal would be to conduct a comprehensive review of all
aspects of the training programs to include classified information. This would
significantly reduce the audience with access to the information but would provide the
policy maker a better understanding of more of the challenges and considerations when
developing fighter pilot training programs.
Studies comparing other stressful and highly technical and skill based professions
This study design is repeatable and could be applied to other highly stressful and
technical training programs such as different military law enforcement, and medical
training programs. There could be great utility in using the same research design in
professions that do not have the same classification and approval concerns to evaluate if
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punctuated events and policy feedbacks may have similar influences on policy
development in different professions.
Training Studies
Although this study focused primarily on the policy process I only scratched the
surface of the potential for future study of not just the policy but also the content of the
training program. Learning style theory was used in this study purely as a classification
tool to better understand how the policy is developed. However, fighter pilots’ instructors
and training course authors could likely benefit from further study focused more on
fighter pilot instructional techniques. This would allow the researcher to further assess
the utility of learning style theories while exploring the science of how students most
efficiently learn high stress occupations. The following section will provide a brief
explanation of some of the possibilities for future research of fighter pilot training
techniques.
Learning and training theory. The basic premise of learning style theory is that
individuals can be classified according to a particular style of learning that best represents
their learning strengths (Panshler et al., 2008). Flemming and Mills’ (as cited in
Romanelli et al, 2009) visual auditory read/write and kinesthetic sensory (VARK) model
was one of the most common and widely used models to explain how individuals learn
(Hawk & Shah, 2007). The concept was built upon the idea that individuals use different
neuro-linguistic programing models to learn most efficiently. Although the VARK model
was used as the basis for this study, there are many other models that could be used to
explore F-16 and F-18 training. In this study I used learning style theory because its a
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readily accepted training model to help set up a policy comparison. I did not attempt to
support, evaluate, or critisize learning style theory but only to use the construct as a
comparative tool.
Learning modalities focusing on the VARK model could be used to further
expand the study of fighter pilot training programs. The concept of learning modalities is
another construct of learning style theory that predicts that sensory preferences affect
how an individual learns (Romanelli, Bird & Ryan, 2009). The F-16 and F-18 training
programs include components of each mode of the VARK model. Therefore, the VARK
model provides a comprehensive framework to examine training programs. As an
example, during F-16 training the student is first given a workbook to read before class
that is designed for the reading and writing learner, the student then attends a lecture
where an instructor discusses the new material for the auditory learner. The instructor
uses power point slides with aircraft pictures and illustrations in-order to aid visual
learners and next the pilots practice what they have learned in a simulator. One
interpretation of learning style theory would suggest that a read-and-write oriented pilot
could read a flight manual and then gain all the information they required to fly an
airplane. In reality, this tactic would likely lead to disaster (Beigh, 2006). A more
plausible interpretation of the theory would suggest that a read-and-write oriented student
would be most successful by reading the course workbook ahead of time before class and
then using class time to have questions answered and test his or her comprehension of the
reading. An auditory or visual learner might be most effective by listening to the
information the first time in class and then reviewing the information after class in the
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work book to review concepts that did not make sense in the lecture. A tactile/kinesthetic
learner might be more effective not reading the flight manual and climbing into the
simulator with the inflight checklist and practicing the basic procedures of setting aircraft
switches and controls to gain a basic understanding and then review the academic
material later. However, flying training programs always have elements of each modality
designed into the program (Carlson, 2011). Understanding how to maximize the
integration of each style of learning while providing enough flexibility for students to
focus on the mode that is most effective for each individual could be evaluated in future
studies.
Implications
The multi-case study comparative analysis of the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
training explored how different training policies impact the effectiveness and efficiency
of the training programs. The USAF and RAAF approach fighter pilot training differently
and some of those differences were highlighted in this study. The USAF may wish to
consider capitalizing on some of the high stress training techniques used by the RAAF to
incorporate into the USAF training programs to expedite the training process during the
current fighter pilot shortage. The USAF may want to decrease the volume of academic
lessons and focus on delivering the most critical lessons closer to the flight-training phase
of the program. The intent would be to provide the students more flights per week to gain
proficiency faster with less time in between each training event.
The significance of improving fighter-training programs is that there is currently a
fighter pilot shortage while there is also a resource and sortie generation shortage, which
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leads to less efficient training and a higher overall cost in time and money to produce a
new fighter pilot. The USAF needs to remain a good steward of taxpayer money by
maximizing capability at the lowest possible cost. My research may provide policy
makers new information that could be beneficial in shaping future training policy
decisions. Improved fighter training policy decisions are important to positive social
change because developing and maintaining proficient fighter pilots is important to the
security and stability of the United States. Developing fighter pilots as cost effectively as
possible helps save resources that the government can put to better use to improve the
lives of its citizens. Another important contribution is that the study structure as well as
the findings and recommendations could be applied to other high stress training
programs. For example improved kinesthetic training techniques and servant leadership
could be used by police, fire, and medical professions to further improve the service
provided to citizens and ultimately contribute to positive social change.
Conclusion
My research examined the fighter pilot training policy process by comparing
USAF and RAAF training policies. The focus of the research was on evaluating the
policy development process by examining how policy feedback and punctuated policy
events influenced policy development. Although the focus of the study was policy
development, in order to understand that process it was important to investigate
components of the training program events, instructional techniques, and overall training
design. Specifically, the study provided a baseline for policy makers to compare and

120
contrast fighter-training policy and attempted to provide new information to improve
evolving training programs while preserving national resources.
Organizational culture was also an important component to understanding the
respective training programs and the interview process was critical to gaining context on
how and why the training policies were developed. Although many cultural differences
were explored during this study I would like to draw attention to quotes from a RAAF
pilot and a USAF pilot to highlight a universal fighter pilot culture that transcends
national boundaries.
The RAAF pilot stated:
A fighter pilot is more than just a job description. It is a state of being. You have
to believe to your core that this is what you were meant to be not just do. You are
a warrior first and foremost. If you do not have this level of dedication you will be
a pilot who fly’s jets but not a fighter pilot.
The USAF pilot explained:
Being a fighter pilot means that you are well trained, disciplined, and expected to
win. That expectation drives a slight amount of aggression and arrogance within
the community, but should be expected when your job depends on you to win
every time you fly.
I believe this shared fighter pilot culture is why this study was possible and why it
is important. It is an opportunity to “debrief” our training programs and leverage that
shared culture to find new and improved ways to improve our craft to defend our
countries. I hope that the information in this study will have utility for both current and
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future USAF fighter training programs and will help fighter pilots maximize training and
always “fly safe.”
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Research Ethics Support Specialist , Office of Research Ethics and Compliance
Leilani Endicott
IRB Chair, Walden University
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Appendix B: Informed Consent
Any Pilot
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory
training policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United
States Air Force. The statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual
who is associated or employed by the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the
Air Force that represents these questions but only in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your
experience as an F-18 fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions
you have prior to consent to participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting
this study. James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and
has flown the F-18 while on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. You probably met Maj
Smith while he was on his exchange tour. However, considering the fact that Maj Smith has returned to the
USAF, he will have no influence on your future career. James takes pride in conducting research to
improve coalition fighter training programs. Hopefully, this research makes a positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order
to understand the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future
fighter training programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The
questions will be in a word document and you will email the completed document back to Maj Smith.
Following publication of the dissertation I will provide you with a one to three page executive summary
and a link to the dissertation.
1 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an
interview or have your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still
decline during the study. You can decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may
decline to answer any question that may be considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or
Australia.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that
appear to be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you
experience any negative thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help
from USAF or RAAF support agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of
command have many voluntary and anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this
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matter will be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study, with your permission. This
information can be used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally, potential conflicts of interest
may arise due to my position within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in this research study that I only
serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate and researcher for Walden University. My position as a military
service member working in the USAF and RAAF is irrelevant to this process.
Compensation
None
Confidentiality/Privacy
With your permission, your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. Your
information will not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research will
include information on your position and experience but will not use your name. If you choose not to have
your position referenced, the researcher will/must maintain your anonymity. For USAF and RAAF
participants a remote but possible exception to confidentiality would be if I learn of an illegal activity or if
my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible any emails or responses made on USAF or
RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the event the USAF or RAAF
does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable information before
submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information concerning respective
USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you during this process.
All information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal laptop, in a passwordprotected folder. Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The
researcher will send you a copy of this form to keep.
Additional Procedures for RAAF Members as Recommended by the Defence People Research Low
Risk Ethics Panel
-

-

-

Only unclassified information is being sought and should be disclosed and that anything
potentially identifiable (about other persons) or classified information will be deleted from
interview records.
RAAF pilot responses will be stored separately from their names and email addresses to ensure
confidentiality. Once I receive your email I will save your responses in a password protected
folder and your name and email address will not be stored in this folder.
Participants need not give any reason if they decline to participate and will in no way have any
detrimental effect on their career.
If you have any complaints with regards to the manner in which the project is conducted please
contact the following Defence representative:
Beck Smith Executive Officer
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 |
F: (02) 6127 2261
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LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au
-

The RAAF fighter pilot community is small and when position and even experience are reported,
respondents may still be easily identifiable. If you have any concerns please request to not have
your experience or position referenced in the study. You may also choose not to participate in the
study. Your name will never be included in the study.

-

If you experience discomfort throughout the process you may contact your chain of command or
the Chaplain for further assistance. Additionally, you may contact the following organization for
further information and support.
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 |
F: (02) 6127 2261
LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au

-

The dissertation will be unclassified and will be available to the public through the Walden
University Website. As a member of the study I will also provide you an executive summary and a
link to the dissertation. I will also provide the executive summary and the link to the 2OCU
Commander for wider RAAF dissemination. The intended audience for this study is to all fighter
pilots and fighter training policy makers.

Additional RAAF Points for Consideration as Highlighted by Defence People Research Low Risk
Ethics Panel:
-

-

Participants will be providing written responses to the interview questions so you will have the
ability to ensure they are satisfied with the accuracy and completeness of responses prior to
submission. If I elect to use partial responses in the research, I will take care to ensure the partial
response is not taken out of context. I will offer the participants the option of reviewing /verifying
their transcript before analysis for the dissertation. Since the participant will write the interview I
do not expect this to be an issue but will coordinate with you if the need arises.
If you choose not to have your position included in the research paper, I will note the restriction
and keep it with the collected data.
I believe this research will provide future benefit to the fighter pilot community because it will
facilitate open dialogue, transparency, and a better understanding of how the USAF and RAAF
train fighter pilots. Improved understanding will likely lead to more effective fighter pilot training
policies. I had the opportunity to fly training and combat missions with many of you and I think
passing that experience onto the next generation of fighter pilots and policy makers is a worthy
endeavor.
Consent Statement

I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about
my involvement. By signing below, I consent and understand that I am agreeing to the terms described
above.
Name of the Participant (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Participant ________________________________________________
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Date of Consent __________________
Name of the Researcher (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Researcher ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
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Group B: RAAF F-18 Instructor Pilot
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training
policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United States Air Force. The
statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual who is associated or employed by
the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the Air Force that represents these questions but only
in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your experience as a
fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions you have prior to consent to
participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting this study.
James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and has flown the F-18 while
on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. You probably met Maj Smith while he was on his exchange
tour. However, considering the fact that Maj Smith has returned to the USAF and was a peer while in the RAAF, he
will have no influence on your future career. James takes pride in conducting research to improve coalition fighter
training programs. Hopefully, this research makes a positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order to understand
the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future fighter training programs
such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The questions
will be in a word document and you will email the completed document back to Maj Smith. Following publication of
the dissertation I will provide you with a one to three page executive summary and a link to the dissertation.
2 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an interview or have
your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still decline during the study. You can
decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may decline to answer any question that may be
considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or Australia.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that appear to
be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you experience any negative
thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help from USAF or RAAF support
agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of command have many voluntary and
anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this matter will
be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study, with your permission. This information can be
used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally, potential conflicts of interest may arise due to my position
within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in this research study that I only serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate
and researcher for Walden University. My position as a military service member working in the USAF and RAAF is
irrelevant to this process.
Compensation
None
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Confidentiality/Privacy
With your permission, your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. Your information will
not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research will include information on your
position and experience but will not use your name. If you choose not to have your position referenced, the researcher
will/must maintain your anonymity. For USAF and RAAF participants a remote but possible exception to
confidentiality would be if I learn of an illegal activity or if my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible
any emails or responses made on USAF or RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the
event the USAF or RAAF does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable information
before submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information concerning respective
USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you during this process. All
information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal laptop, in a password-protected folder.
Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The researcher will
send you a copy of this form to keep.
Additional Procedures for RAAF Members as Recommended by the Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics
Panel
Only unclassified information is being sought and should be disclosed and that anything potentially
identifiable (about other persons) or classified information will be deleted from interview records.
RAAF pilot responses will be stored separately from their names and email addresses to ensure
confidentiality. Once I receive your email I will save your responses in a password protected folder and your
name and email address will not be stored in this folder.
Participants need not give any reason if they decline to participate and will in no way have any detrimental
effect on their career.
If you have any complaints with regards to the manner in which the project is conducted please contact the
following Defence representative:
Beck Smith Executive Officer
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 | F:
(02) 6127 2261
LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au
-

The RAAF fighter pilot community is small and when position and even experience are reported, respondents
may still be easily identifiable. If you have any concerns please request to not have your experience or
position referenced in the study. You may also choose not to participate in the study. Your name will never
be included in the study.

-

If you experience discomfort throughout the process you may contact your chain of command or the Chaplain
for further assistance. Additionally, you may contact the following organization for further information and
support.
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 | F:
(02) 6127 2261
LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au

-

The dissertation will be unclassified and will be available to the public through the Walden University
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Website. As a member of the study I will also provide you an executive summary and a link to the
dissertation. I will also provide the executive summary and the link to the 2OCU Commander for wider
RAAF dissemination. The intended audience for this study is to all fighter pilots and fighter training policy
makers.
Additional RAAF Points for Consideration as Highlighted by Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel:
-

-

Participants will be providing written responses to the interview questions so you will have the ability to
ensure they are satisfied with the accuracy and completeness of responses prior to submission. If I elect to use
partial responses in the research, I will take care to ensure the partial response is not taken out of context. I
will offer the participants the option of reviewing /verifying their transcript before analysis for the
dissertation. Since the participant will write the interview I do not expect this to be an issue but will
coordinate with you if the need arises.
If you choose not to have your position included in the research paper, I will note the restriction and keep it
with the collected data.
I believe this research will provide future benefit to the fighter pilot community because it will facilitate open
dialogue, transparency, and a better understanding of how the USAF and RAAF train fighter pilots. Improved
understanding will likely lead to more effective fighter pilot training policies. I had the opportunity to fly
training and combat missions with many of you and I think passing that experience onto the next generation
of fighter pilots and policy makers is a worthy endeavor.
Consent Statement

I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about my
involvement. By signing below, I consent and understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.
Name of the Participant (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Participant ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
Name of the Researcher (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Researcher ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
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Group C: USAF F-16 Pilots
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory
training policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United
States Air Force. The statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual
who is associated or employed by the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the
Air Force that represents these questions but only in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your
experience as a fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions you have
prior to consent to participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting
this study. James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and
has flown the F-18 while on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. Maj Smith is still in the
USAF and could potentially work in your USAF organization or supervise you in the future. Therefore,
your responses will remain anonymous and Maj Smith will not know which F-16 pilots completed the
questionnaire. Once you have completed the questionnaire your responses will be saved to a specified
USAF network drive from which Maj Smith will retrieve the saved document. James takes pride in
conducting research to improve coalition fighter training programs. Hopefully, this research makes a
positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order
to understand the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future
fighter training programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The
questions will be in a word document and your responses will be saved anonymously to a specified USAF
network drive. Following publication of the dissertation I will have a one to three page executive summary
and a link to the dissertation available for all F-16 pilots that were recruited for this study regardless if they
participated or not. This step will ensure the information is available without sacrificing anonymity.
3 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an
interview or have your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still
decline during the study. You can decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may
decline to answer any question that may be considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or
Australia. The only caveat is that once the drive is saved anonymously you would need to contact Maj
Smith, thereby identifying yourself, so that Maj Smith is aware of which questionnaire to remove.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that
appear to be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you
experience any negative thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help
from USAF or RAAF support agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of
command have many voluntary and anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
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There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this
matter will be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. For Group C your
permission to use your information is granted when you anonymously save your responses to the specified
USAF network drive. This information can be used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally,
potential conflicts of interest may arise due to my position within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in
this research study that I only serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate and researcher for Walden
University. My position as a military service member working in the USAF and RAAF is irrelevant to this
process.
Compensation
None
Confidentiality/Privacy
Your implied permission to use your questionnaire occurs after saving your document anonymously to the
specified USAF network drive. Your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study.
Your information will not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research
will include information on your position and experience. Your name will not be available to Maj Smith. If
you choose not to have your position referenced, the researcher will/must maintain your anonymity. For
USAF and RAAF participants a remote but possible exception to confidentiality would be if I learn of an
illegal activity or if my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible any emails or responses
made on USAF or RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the event the
USAF or RAAF does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable
information before submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information
concerning respective USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you
during this process. All information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal
laptop, in a password-protected folder. Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as
required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The
researcher will send you a copy of this form to keep.
Consent Statement
You have implied consent for Maj Smith to use your responses to the questionnaire when you save the
completed questionnaire anonymously to the specified USAF network drive. There is no need to sign or
return this form.
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Group D: USAF F-16 Instructor Pilots
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory
training policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United
States Air Force. The statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual
who is associated or employed by the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the
Air Force that represents these questions but only in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your
experience as a fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions you have
prior to consent to participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting
this study. James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and
has flown the F-18 while on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. You were selected for
the study in part because you are in the same peer group as Maj Smith and it is highly unlikely he will
supervise you in the future. James takes pride in conducting research to improve coalition fighter training
programs. Hopefully, this research makes a positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order
to understand the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future
fighter training programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The
questions will be in a word document and you will email the completed document back to Maj Smith.
Following publication of the dissertation I will provide you with a one to three page executive summary
and a link to the dissertation.
4 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an
interview or have your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still
decline during the study. You can decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may
decline to answer any question that may be considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or
Australia.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that
appear to be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you
experience any negative thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help
from USAF or RAAF support agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of
command have many voluntary and anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this
matter will be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study, with your permission. This
information can be used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally, potential conflicts of interest
may arise due to my position within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in this research study that I only
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serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate and researcher for Walden University. My position as a military
service member working in the USAF and RAAF is irrelevant to this process.
Compensation
None
Confidentiality/Privacy
With your permission, your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. Your
information will not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research will
include information on your position and experience but will not use your name. If you choose not to have
your position referenced, the researcher will/must maintain your anonymity. For USAF and RAAF
participants a remote but possible exception to confidentiality would be if I learn of an illegal activity or if
my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible any emails or responses made on USAF or
RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the event the USAF or RAAF
does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable information before
submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information concerning respective
USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you during this process.
All information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal laptop, in a passwordprotected folder. Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The
researcher will send you a copy of this form to keep.
Consent Statement
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about
my involvement. By signing below, I consent and understand that I am agreeing to the terms described
above.
Name of the Participant (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Participant ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
Name of the Researcher (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Researcher ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
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Group E: USAF F-15E Pilot
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory
training policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United
States Air Force. The statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual
who is associated or employed by the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the
Air Force that represents these questions but only in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your
experience as a fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions you have
prior to consent to participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting
this study. James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and
has flown the F-18 while on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. You were selected for
this study in part because you fly a different airframe as Maj Smith and it is highly unlikely he could
supervise you in the future. James takes pride in conducting research to improve coalition fighter training
programs. Hopefully, this research makes a positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order
to understand the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future
fighter training programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The
questions will be in a word document and you will email the completed document back to Maj Smith.
Following publication of the dissertation I will provide you with a one to three page executive summary
and a link to the dissertation.
5 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an
interview or have your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still
decline during the study. You can decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may
decline to answer any question that may be considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or
Australia.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that
appear to be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you
experience any negative thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help
from USAF or RAAF support agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of
command have many voluntary and anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this
matter will be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study, with your permission. This
information can be used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally, potential conflicts of interest
may arise due to my position within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in this research study that I only
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serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate and researcher for Walden University. My position as a military
service member working in the USAF and RAAF is irrelevant to this process.
Compensation
None
Confidentiality/Privacy
With your permission, your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. Your
information will not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research will
include information on your position and experience but will not use your name. If you choose not to have
your position referenced, the researcher will/must maintain your anonymity. For USAF and RAAF
participants a remote but possible exception to confidentiality would be if I learn of an illegal activity or if
my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible any emails or responses made on USAF or
RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the event the USAF or RAAF
does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable information before
submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information concerning respective
USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you during this process.
All information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal laptop, in a passwordprotected folder. Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The
researcher will send you a copy of this form to keep.
Consent Statement
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about
my involvement. By signing below, I consent and understand that I am agreeing to the terms described
above.
Name of the Participant (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Participant ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
Name of the Researcher (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Researcher ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
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Group F: RAAF F-18 Pilot Who Served as a USAF-22 Exchange Pilot
You are asked to participate in a research study that addresses USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training
policy. This is an independent research case study and is not endorsed or sponsored by the United States Air Force. The
statements and questions addressed by the researcher do not represent any individual who is associated or employed by
the United States Air Force. The researcher is the only member of the Air Force that represents these questions but only
in the capacity as a PhD Candidate.
You were selected for this research study because of your knowledge of aviation training and your experience as a
fighter pilot. Please read this form in its entirety and feel free to ask any questions you have prior to consent to
participation in this study.
Major James D. Smith is a researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Walden University and will be conducting this study.
James has been an active duty Air Force service member for 14 years and is an F-16 pilot and has flown the F-18 while
on an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Air Force. You probably met Maj Smith while he was on his exchange
tour. However, considering the fact that Maj Smith has returned to the USAF and was a peer while in the RAAF, he
will have no influence on your future career. James takes pride in conducting research to improve coalition fighter
training programs. Hopefully, this research makes a positive difference.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to compare USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 introductory training policy in order to understand
the current policy process and to identify best practices that can be implemented in future fighter training programs
such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Procedures
If you elect to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a ten question written interview. The questions
will be in a word document and you will email the completed document back to Maj Smith. Following publication of
the dissertation I will provide you with a one to three page executive summary and a link to the dissertation.
6 Volunteer Agreement
Your participation in this research study is strictly voluntary. This means you can opt to decline to an interview or have
your interview removed from this research. If you decide to participate, you can still decline during the study. You can
decline to participate anytime during the research process and you may decline to answer any question that may be
considered harmful or negatively affect the United States or Australia.
Risks and Benefits of Participation in this Study
It is a possibility some questions may be uncomfortable to answer. Please feel free to decline questions that appear to
be uncomfortable or may impact the United States or Australia in a negative manner. If you experience any negative
thoughts or emotions as a result of this questionnaire I encourage you to seek help from USAF or RAAF support
agencies. For example the mental health office, Chaplin, and your chain of command have many voluntary and
anonymous options to seek additional help if need.
There are no benefits for your participation in this study. Nevertheless, your professional expertise on this matter will
be noted as well as quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study, with your permission. This information can be
used to modify future fighter training policy. Additionally, potential conflicts of interest may arise due to my position
within the USAF and RAAF. I will ensure in this research study that I only serve in the capacity as a PhD candidate
and researcher for Walden University. My position as a military service member working in the USAF and RAAF is
irrelevant to this process.
Compensation
None
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Confidentiality/Privacy
With your permission, your statements will be quoted and/or paraphrased in this research study. Your information will
not be used outside of this research study. Also, with your permission, the research will include information on your
position and experience but will not use your name. If you choose not to have your position referenced, the researcher
will/must maintain your anonymity. For USAF and RAAF participants a remote but possible exception to
confidentiality would be if I learn of an illegal activity or if my dataset is subpoenaed. Although unlikely it is possible
any emails or responses made on USAF or RAAF systems could be requested for review by the USAF or RAAF. In the
event the USAF or RAAF does request to review research data I will ask to remove participant identifiable information
before submission. However, I will comply with USAF and RAAF requests for information concerning respective
USAF and RAAF members. You may keep copies of all documents submitted to you during this process. All
information will be kept confidential and data will be kept secure on a personal laptop, in a password-protected folder.
Finally, data will be kept for a period of at least five years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions
If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. The researcher will
send you a copy of this form to keep.
Additional Procedures for RAAF Members as Recommended by the Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics
Panel

-

-

Only unclassified information is being sought and should be disclosed and that anything potentially
identifiable (about other persons) or classified information will be deleted from interview records.
RAAF pilot responses will be stored separately from their names and email addresses to ensure
confidentiality. Once I receive your email I will save your responses in a password protected folder and your
name and email address will not be stored in this folder.
Participants need not give any reason if they decline to participate and will in no way have any detrimental
effect on their career.
If you have any complaints with regards to the manner in which the project is conducted please contact the
following Defence representative:
Beck Smith Executive Officer
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 | F:
(02) 6127 2261
LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au

-

The RAAF fighter pilot community is small and when position and even experience are reported, respondents
may still be easily identifiable. If you have any concerns please request to not have your experience or
position referenced in the study. You may also choose not to participate in the study. Your name will never
be included in the study.

-

If you experience discomfort throughout the process you may contact your chain of command or the Chaplain
for further assistance. Additionally, you may contact the following organization for further information and
support.
Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel Directorate of People Intelligence
& Research Workforce Planning Branch Department of Defence
BP33-4-016 | Brindabella Park | PO Box 7927 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610 P: (02) 6127 2155 | F:
(02) 6127 2261
LREP: peopleresearch.ethics@defence.gov.au
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-

The dissertation will be unclassified and will be available to the public through the Walden University
Website. As a member of the study I will also provide you an executive summary and a link to the
dissertation. I will also provide the executive summary and the link to the 2OCU Commander for wider
RAAF dissemination. The intended audience for this study is to all fighter pilots and fighter training policy
makers.

Additional RAAF Points for Consideration as Highlighted by Defence People Research Low Risk Ethics Panel:
-

-

Participants will be providing written responses to the interview questions so you will have the ability to
ensure they are satisfied with the accuracy and completeness of responses prior to submission. If I elect to use
partial responses in the research, I will take care to ensure the partial response is not taken out of context. I
will offer the participants the option of reviewing /verifying their transcript before analysis for the
dissertation. Since the participant will write the interview I do not expect this to be an issue but will
coordinate with you if the need arises.
If you choose not to have your position included in the research paper, I will note the restriction and keep it
with the collected data.
I believe this research will provide future benefit to the fighter pilot community because it will facilitate open
dialogue, transparency, and a better understanding of how the USAF and RAAF train fighter pilots. Improved
understanding will likely lead to more effective fighter pilot training policies. I had the opportunity to fly
training and combat missions with many of you and I think passing that experience onto the next generation
of fighter pilots and policy makers is a worthy endeavor.
Consent Statement

I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about my
involvement. By signing below, I consent and understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.
Name of the Participant (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Participant ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
Name of the Researcher (PRINT) ___________________________________________
Signature of the Researcher ________________________________________________
Date of Consent __________________
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol
Fighter Pilot Training Policy Interview
Nationality:
Fighter Aircraft Flow:
Hours in Each Aircraft:
Quals (Wgn man, Flt Ld, IP, Wpns Officer, MC):
Exchange Officer: Yes/No
Questions:
1. What changes have you seen in fighter pilot training philosophy, methods, and
technology during your career?
2. Do you think the changes have improved or hindered the quality of fighter pilots?
3. What is the biggest change to fighter pilot training policy you would like to see
implemented in the future?
4. When preparing for flight training what techniques do you find most effective to facilitate
your learning? For example, do you prefer to read study material, chair fly, work in
groups, or obtain help from other students and instructors? Additionally, during training
sorties and simulators is your performance best when an instructor demonstrates tasks
and instantly corrects your mistakes or do you prefer to receive instruction in the brief
and debrief and only receive inputs concerning safety of flight while airborne?
5. Describe what you perceive to be the perfect balance of academic, simulator, and flight
training to maximize your learning as a fighter pilot?
6. Do you think improved simulator capabilities, aircraft upgrades, and new aircraft such as
the F-35 will allow for a reduction in flight hours to maintain the same combat readiness?
Please explain your rationale.
7. What do you see as the best part of each fighter training program you have experienced
that you would offer to allied partners to improve their training policy and programs?
8. Describe your thoughts on what it means to be a fighter pilot and your perspective on the
culture of the fighter pilot community:
9. What feedback would you provide your previous instructors and course support agencies
to improve future training programs?
10. Please draw upon your experience and provide any additional thoughts, opinions,
observations, or stories you would like to share concerning fighter pilot training, fighter
pilot culture, the future of fighter aircraft or the future of the fighter pilot.
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Appendix D: Initial Contact E-mail
Good Morning/Evening (Participant), My name is James Smith and I would like to ask
you to participate in a research study.
I am a Doctoral Candidate at Walden University. In order to fulfill the requirements to
obtain a Ph.D. in Public Policy and Administration, I am conducting a qualitative
research case study on the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 fighter pilot training policy. As a
PhD Candidate, I am also an active duty Air Force F-16 pilot with 14 years of service,
who has knowledge of fighter training programs.
If you agree to this study, you will be asked to complete a 30 – 45 minute written
interview over email.
In the questionnaire, I will ask you a series of questions that relate to the introductory
fighter training programs and policy as well as fighter pilot culture based on your
professional expertise. No precise hypotheses are being tested and this qualitative
research case study is intended to gain understanding of how fighter pilot training policy
is developed and how it can be improved in the future.
After the interview, you have the right to retract and/or clarify any statement you made.
Revised copies of the transcriptions will be e-mailed to you in a summary of the results.
Your participation and professional expertise is definitely appreciated and extremely
valuable to this research study. Additionally, your participation in this research will
immensely assist in filling an information gap in the current literature involving fighter
pilot training policy.
Your consideration to participate in this qualitative research study is greatly appreciated.
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at your
earliest convenience. If you would like to participate in this study, please respond to this
e-mail or call me at the information listed below.
Once again, thank you for your consideration and I am looking forward to your response!
Very Respectfully,
Maj James “Kane” Smith
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Appendix E: Debriefing Form
Title of Research Study:
Comparative Analysis of the USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 Training Programs
Statement of Appreciation:
I would like thank you for your time and cooperation through the interview process. Your
experience and expertise are vital and what you have provided will be an asset to the
success of this qualitative research case study:
Brief Synopsis of Research Study:
The purpose of this qualitative study is to compare and understand the differences
between USAF F-16 training and RAAF F-18 training policy in order to provide policy
makers new knowledge to improve future fighter training programs such as the F-35
program.
Point of Contact:
If you have questions about this study, would like to know more information about the
topic, or would like to receive a reproduction of this research study when it is finalized,
please contact: Researcher: James D. Smith
Point of Contact about your rights in this experiment:
Walden University Institutional Review Board Email: irb@waldenu.edu
Thank you again for your participation!
Cheers,
James “Kane” Smith
Phd Candidate
Student ID: 00363046
PhD Public Policy & Administration Program
Walden University
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Appendix F: Confidentiality Agreement
Name of Signer:
During the course of my activity in collecting data for this research: “Comparative Analysis of the USAF
F-16 and RAAF F-18 Training Programs”, I will have access to information, which is confidential and
should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must remain confidential, and that improper
disclosure of confidential information can be damaging to the participant.
By signing this Confidentiality Agreement I acknowledge and agree that:
I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family.
I will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any confidential information except
as properly authorized.
I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it
is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant’s name is not used.
I will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or purging of confidential
information.
I agree that my obligations under this agreement will continue after termination of the job that I will
perform.
I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.
I will only access or use systems or devices I’m officially authorized to access and I will not demonstrate
the operation or function of systems or devices to unauthorized individuals.
Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to
comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.
Print Name _____________________________________ (researcher)
Signature _______________________________________
Date____________________________________________
Print Name _______________________________________ (data analysis consultant or transcriber)
Signature _________________________________________
Date _____________________________________________
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Appendix G: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix H: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix I: 2OCU CO Talking Points
Sir,
I wanted to start by explaining that my Dissertation is focused as a policy study rather than a
training or training philosophy study. I’m intentionally avoiding anything to do with RAAF F-18
system or pilot capabilities. I am not discussing anything concerning current or future adversaries.
The study is unclassified and I have no desire to release the SATG. My game plan is to use the
SATG and the F-16 Syllabus to compare each program so I can present policy findings in the
dissertation itself. I do not intend to publish my raw data from the research in its entirety.
However, I would like to put bits of comparative data into tables and figures to highlight
similarities and differences in the programs that will be presented in Chapter 4 and 5 of the
dissertation. Where I am highlighting specific differences, if you prefer, I could always write in
comparative terms rather than specific numbers. For example the USAF does XX% less
conversion sorties than the RAAF as opposed to stating the actual numbers. I have included an
example sheet of raw data I have taken from the F-16 syllabus that we can use for our discussion
on Monday.
Below I’ll just highlight some of the major differences I have noticed in RAAF and USAF
training policy and the types of things I am interested in comparing in the study. I would like to
use the SATG as a source to support the policy discussion. I’d also like to accomplish a limited
number of email interviews with past OCU students, exchange officers, etc. to add some context
to what I learn during the comparative process.
USAF and RAAF Differences
1. RAAF Squadron vs. USAF MAJCOM ownership of the syllabus
The SATG is owned by the OCU commander compared with AETC in the USAF. Although the
training scales are different I would like to look at the differences in each organization’s process.
I am using Policy Feedback Theory to explore how current policy influences future policy and I
think this a good entry point for this discussion. (ie. OCU can make changes much more quickly
than the USAF).
2. Simulator Training
The USAF and RAAF place different emphasis on simulator training and I would like to compare
how the simulator is used for training. As far as level of detail I don’t really want to go deeper
than Conversion, AA, and AS weight of effort. I don’t care about BFM vs. DCA or specific
proficiency levels. I’m looking at how the RAAF and USAF integrate simulators into their
respective training policies. This portion focuses partly on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, which
predicts that punctuated events (i.e. technology changes) can bring about large changes in policy.
3. Course Delivery methods
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Lecture, workbook, self-study etc. I’d like to look at the delivery methods because this ties into
learning style theory where different instructional delivery methods can impact how well different
students absorb information.
4. Emergency Procedure and Instrument training.
Looking at differences in rate of effort and how students learn this material. For example the
RAAF emphasizes Boldface and a bit more memorization compared with more in-depth systems
academics in the USAF. Also USAF students leave the course with a much more restrictive
weather category than RAAF students.
5. Solo vs. Dual training
The RAAF does a lot more dual training. In my opinion this allows instructors to “fill student’s
bucket” to a higher level per sortie in the RAAF syllabus because there is a safety net in the back
seat. My intent is to use the SATG to show the difference and discuss the impacts.
6. Experience levels of students.
Looking at the average experience of a new F-16 vs. F-18 student when they start training. This
isn’t in the SATG but something I’m interested in.
7. Policies to handle struggling students.
This is also not documented in the SATG but it is discussed at length in the F-16 syllabus. I
would like to discuss these types of administrative policies
8. Timelines
Six month F-18 course vs. nine month USAF course. Looking at impacts due to the different
timelines.
9. I’ve also attached my proposed interview questions and am using the questions to explore
cultural differences between the USAF and RAAF fighter organizations. I think the interviews
will add perspective to the document analysis.
I am happy to accommodate your concerns and am confident there is plenty of room to develop
an unclassified study that is relevant from a policy perspective. I look forward to discussing.
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Appendix J: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix K: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix L: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix M: Permission to Conduct Research
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Appendix N: Executive Summary
TO: Commanders and Research Participants.
FROM: Lt Col James D. Smith, Student ID 00363046
SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Walden University Dissertation Titled: Comparative Analysis of the
USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18 Training Programs
BRIEF SYNOPSIS: I conducted a qualitative multi-case study comparing USAF F-16 and RAAF F-18
introductory training policy. I explored policy feedback, punctuated equilibrium, and learning style theories
to better understand how and why specific training policies are developed and implemented.
1. This summary presents the study findings and recommendations.
2. Findings:
§
§
§

The primary differences between the USAF and RAAF programs were the result of contrasting
resource availabilities and cultural differences.
Policy feedbacks and punctuated events influenced the fighter pilot training policy process.
Best practices identified throughout the training included well-designed stress application
techniques designed to maximize students’ learning coupled with servant instructors, and a timely
introduction of academic, simulator, and flight training.

3. Recommendations for USAF F-16 Training:
§

§
§
§
§

Reduce academic depth during introductory F-16 training with the intent to better align academic
timing to occur within a one-week period of simulator and flight training. Currently, students are
often introduced to new material weeks in advance of simulator and flight training, which is
difficult for students to focus on the next event considering the extended delays between events.
Increase flight frequency to consolidate learning. Three to four flights a week would be optimum.
Reduce F-16 D model requirements in F-16 training to instill single seat mentality and simplify
scheduling requirements.
Delegate syllabus waiver authority to the Operations Group or Squadron Commander
Conduct a classified study of F-16 fighter pilot training policy.

4. In order to remain at the unclassified level this study focused primarily on policy, culture, and
instructional differences and does not address detailed training or tactical content. The recommendations
are the authors alone and do not reflect the opinion of the USAF or the RAAF. The study focuses primarily
on understanding the policy process and the recommendations in this document are not the main focus of
this study. However, fighter pilots are the primary audience of this executive summary. Therefore, I
focused on practical applications rather than theoretical content.
5. Questions should be addressed to Lt Col James D. Smith at james.smith.39@us.af.mil

